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RESTORING THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN WESTERN WATER LAW
Mark Squillace*
Abstract
American Western states and virtually every country and state with
positive water resources law are in perfect agreement about the wisdom
of treating their water resources as public property. Not surprisingly, this
has led most Western states to articulate a goal of managing these
resources in the public interest. But the meaning of the term “public
interest,” especially in the context of water resources management, is far
from clear. This Article strives to bring clarity to that issue. It begins by
exploring three theoretical approaches that might be used for defining the
public interest in water resources law before urging an approach that
prioritizes communal values. It then calls on each state to articulate its
own, objective definition of the public interest—one that can serve as a
meaningful legal standard. Included in this call to action is an outline of
a public, deliberative process that states might use to formulate such a
definition. This is followed by an investigation of the current attitudes of
Western states toward the public interest standard, which includes a
survey of whether and how a public interest review is incorporated into
each state’s administration of water rights. The survey reveals that most
Western states routinely fail to meet their obligation to consider the public
interest in water rights administration, despite unambiguous public
interest mandates. I conclude by recommending changes to existing water
resource management regimes that will help ensure accounting for public
values.
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I. INTRODUCTION
[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable and
independent of particular theory than the interest of the public of a State
to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished,
except by such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may
permit for the purpose of turning them to a more perfect use. This public
interest is omnipresent wherever there is a State, and grows more pressing
as population grows. It is fundamental, and we are of [the] opinion that
the private property of riparian proprietors cannot be supposed to have
deeper roots.1
No appropriation shall be denied except when such denial is
demanded by the public interests.2
Ask any resident of the Western United States to describe local water law, and
you will likely hear that the “prior appropriation” doctrine protects private water
users according to the order that they first diverted water for beneficial uses. “First
in time, first in right” is the jingle often used to describe Western water law; that is,
the water rights of an earlier appropriator have legal priority over the rights of a
junior appropriator.3 However, it is probably unlikely that the same Westerner is
aware that water has been deemed the property of the State from the earliest
incarnations of the prior appropriation doctrine. That is, public interest
considerations limit the private right to use water in virtually every Western state
(the notable exception being Colorado).4

1

Hudson Cty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908) (Holmes, J.).
WYO. CONST. art. VIII, §3.
3
Under the prior appropriation system, the first appropriator to put water to beneficial
use receives their entire allocation of water before the next person in priority receives any
water. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 12.01 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed.
LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 2019) [hereinafter WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS].
2

A property right in the use of water is created by diversion of the water from a
stream (or lake) and its application to a beneficial use. Water can be used at any
location, without regard to the position of place of use in relation to the stream.
In the event of a shortage of supply, water will be supplied up to a limit of the
right in order of temporal priority: the last man to divert and make use of the
stream is the first to have his supply cut off. Id. (citing CHARLES J. MEYERS, A
HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIATION SYSTEM 4
(1971)). The allocation of water proceeds in this way until water is no longer
available, either because the stream has run dry, or as contended in this Article,
because the public interest would not be served by allowing any further allocation.
4

Colorado is the notable exception to this general rule, as discussed infra Part VII.
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The failure of many Western states to embrace their responsibility to protect
public values in water has profound consequences for water management. So long
as priorities are maintained, private water rights are commonly allocated and may
be used without regard for public needs.5 If the public or its elected officials believe
that water should be preserved in the stream for recreational, aesthetic, or other
purposes, then those interests are typically asked to stand in line with every other
water user and trust their fate to the prior appropriation system.6 Too often, this leads
to dewatered streams while inefficient irrigation practices abound.7
In this Article, I argue for restoring the public interest to its rightful role as a
universal limitation on water rights, with a particular focus on the Western United
States. I begin in Part II by exploring how the public interest concept informs public
policy generally. This explanation is offered to identify and illuminate a framework
that can help guide the allocation and administration of water resources. In Part III,
I proceed to outline different perspectives on what the term “public interest” means,
offering a definition centered on common public values. Then, in Part IV, I describe
a model deliberative process whereby water management agencies could fairly and
meaningfully define the public interest. This is followed by a brief explanation of
the distinction in Part V between the public interest and the public trust doctrine.
These two related but distinct ideas are easily conflated, and I explain why my focus
is on the public interest. Instream flow laws are briefly addressed in Part VI to
explain how they can unintentionally undermine efforts to protect public interest
values in water.
In Part VII, I turn to an historical look at the evolution of Western water law
and an overview of the water appropriation process typical of modern administrative
systems. This leads to a survey of the water allocation laws of twelve Western states
in Part VIII, with a focus on how the laws in these states protect (or were designed
to protect) the public interest. While the record is mixed, many states appear to give
short shrift to positive law8 standards requiring consideration of the public interest
in making water allocation decisions.
All of this sets up a discussion in Part IX of a possible path forward that is more
sensitive to public interest concerns. The entrenched policies embedded in the
traditional water management schemes employed by Western states will be difficult
to overcome, but regulatory and judicial reforms hold some promise for better
protecting public values, and this part analyzes the opportunities and obstacles to
5

See, e.g., Interview with Pat Tyrell, Wyo. State Engineer in Cheyenne, Wyo. (July 12,
2007), discussed infra note 190 and accompanying text.
6
See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-1001(b) (2019).
7
See, e.g., Todd Reeve, Harnessing a Voluntary Market to Restore Flow to Dewatered
Rivers and Streams, GLOBAL WATER FORUM (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.globalwaterforum
.org/2012/08/14/harnessing-a-voluntary-market-to-restore-flow-to-dewatered-rivers-andstreams/ [https://perma.cc/5JNJ-WQET].
8
The reference to “positive law” used in this Article refers to legislative or
constitutional pronouncements, in contrast to judicial precedent. See Positive Law, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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implementing appropriate reforms. I conclude in Part X with recommendations for
states and other parties that might want to bring about much-needed reforms that
will better protect the public values associated with our water resources.
II. THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND PUBLIC POLICY
The public interest as a guiding principle of public policy is not unique to the
water resources field. One of the more prominent and longstanding American
examples of a policy guided by a public interest standard is the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 (FCA).9 The FCA established the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), which is tasked with “regulat[ing] interstate
and foreign commerce in communication . . . without discrimination . . . .”10 To carry
out this mission, the Act authorizes the FCC to “prescribe such rules and regulations
as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this Act.”11
But what does it mean that regulations are “in the public interest”? Two recent FCC
regulatory actions on net neutrality shed light on this question, even as they raise the
prospect that protecting the public interest is a futile endeavor, so long as the term
lacks an objective definition.
In 2015, the FCC issued a final rule barring broadband internet providers from
blocking, throttling, or engaging in the paid prioritization of their online services.12
This action sought to ensure that internet providers treat all content on the web
equally and non-preferentially—an elusive objective known as net neutrality.13 By
classifying consumer broadband service as a “telecommunications service,” the FCC
claimed it had the authority to regulate internet service providers as utilities under
the common-carrier provisions of the FCA, and it repeatedly invoked the public
interest to support its decision.14 Less than three years later, however, following a
change in leadership at the FCC, the Commission issued a new rule repealing the
2015 rule.15 In particular, the FCC stripped broadband services of their designation
as a “telecommunications service” and opined that the FCC lacked the authority to
regulate such services.16 “Given the unknown needs of the networks of the future,”
the order reads, “it is our determination that the utility-style regulations . . . run
contrary to the public interest.”17 In short, two diametrically opposed regulations
were both purportedly cloaked in the public interest.

9

Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73–416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151–624 (2018)).
10
47 U.S.C. § 151.
11
Id. § 201(b) (emphasis added).
12
80 Fed. Reg. 19,738 (Apr. 13, 2015) (repealed).
13
Id.
14
Id. at passim (referencing the “public interest” a total of 122 times).
15
83 Fed. Reg. 7852 (Feb. 22, 2018) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 8, and 20).
16
Id. at 7853.
17
Id. at 7871.
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The dueling invocation of the “public interest” in the net neutrality example
above lays bare a key tension that I address in this Article: If, under a statute, the
public interest can be constructed to mean one thing but also the opposite of that
very thing, then that statute fails to establish a meaningful regulatory standard. Put
another way, the “public interest” must have an ascertainable, objective meaning to
avoid being hollow, surplus language.18 Moreover, if the term lacks an objective
meaning, then it cannot logically serve as an “intelligible principle” sufficient to
support a constitutional delegation of legislative power.19 Many state courts also
apply similar nondelegation doctrines, rooted in their own constitutional separation
of powers jurisprudence.20
In this Article, I argue that, while subject to interpretation and nuance, the
public interest must be reducible to an objective definition. Only then can it serve as
a proper limitation on delegated power sufficient to satisfy constitutional
standards.21 This is not to say that the public interest can mean only one thing.
Because the public interest reflects a societal value judgment, and because societal
values evolve, so too can the meaning of the term. But as I attempt to demonstrate
below in Part III, the public interest must have a discrete meaning that derives from
18

The rule against surplusage is a time-honored canon of construction that urges judges
to construe text such that each word and phrase has meaning. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 174 (2012); see also
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (“These words cannot be meaningless, else
they would not have been used.”).
19
See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (holding
that “[i]f Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the
person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is
not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”). Yet the Supreme Court has already held
that the public interest standard in the FCA does, in fact, afford the FCC a sufficient basis
upon which it may exercise its regulatory power. Nat’l Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943).
20
See, e.g., State v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 736 P.2d 1140, 1143 (Alaska 1987)
(discussing application of federal delegation doctrine cases by state courts); El Dorado Oil
Works v. McColgan, 215 P.2d 4, 8–9 (Cal. 1950) (“The essential requirement [of the
nondelegation doctrine] is the Legislature’s specification of a standard—an intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized to administer the act is directed to conform”
(internal citations omitted)); People v. Holmes, 959 P.2d 406, 409–10 (Colo. 1998)
(discussing the judicial standards and development of Colorado’s nondelegation doctrine);
Newport Int’l Univ., Inc. v. State, 186 P.3d 382, 388 (Wyo. 2008) (“The nondelegation
doctrine is a judicial construction which limits the exercise of power by actors not elected to
or otherwise employed within a designated branch of government . . . State constitutional
vesting clauses, which entrust certain branches of government with specified functions and
powers, are the primary source of limitations on delegations.”).
21
To be sure, courts might have greater flexibility to construe the public interest to
accommodate two different—potentially even inconsistent—interpretations outside of the
nondelegation doctrine context. One example is in the context of a deferential agency review
standard such as that articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 844, 865 (1984).
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an objective framework. To put it another way, the public interest cannot simply be
applied to mean whatever an individual regulator decides it should mean.22
This leads me to ask how best to define “public interest,” recognizing that
defining the term is a matter that has particular resonance for a common-pool
resource such as water. Like the air we breathe, the public understands that water is
a communal resource with important public values, and modern societies expect
their governments to manage water resources responsibly and protect those public
values.23
III. DEFINING THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Despite its widespread acceptance as a core principle for evaluating policy and
its exhaustive treatment in scholarly literature, the public interest remains an elusive
concept, and scholars and policymakers alike have struggled to ascertain a precise,
normative meaning.24 The public interest surely encompasses “community values,”
but what about private values that also arguably enhance public welfare? And what
role does subjective bias play in influencing the proper choice and scope of relevant
values?25 While one can potentially conjure a wide range of approaches for
22

For example, it seems beyond peradventure that if a government agency gave all of
the water resources in a particular basin to a single for-profit entity, without limitation, that
decision would be contrary to the public interest.
23
See Mitch Tobin, 7 Things I Learned Studying Public Opinion on Water, NEWS
DEEPLY: WATER DEEPLY (May 1, 2017), https://www.newsdeeply.com/water/articles/2017
/05/01/7-things-i-learned-studying-public-opinion-on-water
[https://perma.cc/8267UKKH].
24
See RICHARD E. FLATHMAN, THE PUBLIC INTEREST: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE
NORMATIVE DISCOURSE OF POLITICS 9–13 (1966) (providing an extensive analysis of the
“public interest” that distinguishes between its commendatory and descriptive meanings). As
a commendatory phrase, the public interest occupies an important role in political rhetoric.
Id. The other meaning is descriptive and is used to whether a certain policy fits the defined
public interest criteria. Id. Rhetorical maneuvers abound in politics, leading politicians to
sometimes invoke the phrase for its commendatory meaning without carefully thinking
through what criteria should be invoked to apply the descriptive meaning. Id. The arguments
found in the remainder of this Article focus on the descriptive meaning of the public interest.
See also C.W. Cassinelli, Some Reflections on the Concept of the Public Interest, 69 ETHICS
48–49 (1958) (identifying three categories of problems with trying to define the public
interest, but also suggesting that “an opposition between the public interest and individual
interests is not consistent with a democratic ethic . . . .”). For reasons stated in this Part of
the Article, I largely reject this claim put forth by Professor Cassinelli.
25
Subjective views inevitably influence the interpretation of the public interest, but
subjective perspectives should not be confused with selfishness. The former describes a
particular interpretation of communal values influenced by one’s “location” (geographically,
socially, etc.) within a “common world.” See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 57
(1958). The latter constitutes a violation of duty by explicitly ignoring the consequences of
an action. See FLATHMAN, supra note 24, at 26–28. The presence of subjective values
requires the public interest to incorporate these often-competing views in the policy process.
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elucidating the public interest, they generally fit into three categories: (A) an
economic or utilitarian approach; (B) a pluralist approach; and (C) a view of the
public interest as solely reflective of shared communal and societal values.
A. The Utilitarian Approach to the Public Interest
The first of the common frameworks defining the public interest takes an
economic or utilitarian approach, asserting that the public interest be defined to
promote decisions that maximize overall wealth;26 or restated in more egalitarian
and progressive-era terms, actions that afford “the greatest good of the greatest
number in the long run.”27 A utilitarian approach has several advantages. It offers an
objective standard that can, in theory, be readily ascertained. This is because
maximizing net present values relies on defining costs and benefits that, even if
difficult to quantify, will offer objective variables upon which to base the public
interest. Moreover, if initial projections of costs and benefits of a decision or choice
turn out to be inaccurate or incomplete, or if values or conditions change the
utilitarian calculus, the decision can often be adapted to reflect the new
information.28 In this way, utilitarianism is also inherently flexible.
The procedural component of the public interest will be further outlined below.
26
See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 12–13 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) [hereinafter BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION] (“The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons
who are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the community
then is, what?—the sum of the interest of the several members who compose it . . . . An
action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of utility, or, for shortness sake,
to utility, (meaning with respect to the community at large) when the tendency it has to
augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it.”).
27
Jeremy Bentham first articulated the idea that “it is the greatest happiness of the
greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong.” JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT
ON THE COMMENTARIES AND THE FRAGMENT OF GOVERNMENT 393 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A
Hart eds., 2010). Gifford Pinchot, the renowned conservation and first Chief of the U.S.
Forest Service, adapted this principle, adding a time element: “Where conflicting interests
must be reconciled, the question shall always be answered from the standpoint of the greatest
good of the greatest number in the long run.” See Pinchot and Utilitarianism, THE GREATEST
GOOD, https://www.fs.fed.us/greatestgood/press/mediakit/facts/pinchot.shtml [https://perma
.cc/DTT6-6UEJ] (last visited June 27, 2018).
28
Professor Douglas Grant has written extensively on the public interest’s function in
water policy. See, e.g., Douglas L. Grant, Public Interest Review of Water Right Allocation
and Transfer in the West: Recognition of Public Values, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681 (1987)
[hereinafter Grant, Public Interest Review] (examining the evolution of public interest review
to reflect public values). Grant argues that the public interest serves to assess and weigh the
externalities of a given water project or policy. Id. at 702–707. Grant later characterizes this
cost-benefit-style approach to the public interest as the “maximum benefits model.” See
Douglas L. Grant, Two Models of Public Interest of Water Allocation in the West, 9 U. DENV.
WTR. L. REV. 485, 490, 498 (2006) [hereinafter Grant, Two Models]. Such a model, Grant
argues, has been able to incorporate new values, such as ecological values, into public
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On the other hand, a utilitarian approach tends to play out in terms of costs and
benefits that can be readily measured in monetary terms.29 This often excludes or
undervalues costs and benefits for intangible assets such as aesthetic, existential, or
communal values,30 and it is these shared values that are perhaps most reflective of
the public’s interests. Moreover, efforts to quantify the value of such intangible
assets are often tried but rarely succeed.31 Indeed, the results are almost always
presented in terms of the economic value of environmental assets to humans, as
opposed to any inherent value that they might possess.32 How should a society, for
example, value a free-flowing stream? Is it enough to identify the economic values
associated with riparian property, or with fishing, boating, or otherwise recreating
in or on the stream? Or does a free-flowing stream have some intrinsic value that
should also be taken into account? And how should society value the use and
enjoyment of the stream by future generations? As the world’s population grows and
fewer water resources remain pristine, is it not likely that those water resources that
continue to survive in a relatively unspoiled condition will hold far greater value to
future people than can be appreciated today? Because there are no easy answers to

interest review. Id. at 495. As suggested in the text, cost-benefit analysis is fraught with
problems, especially in the context of assessing the value of commonly held public resources
like water. See id. at 495–98.
29
See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, The Challenge of Regulating Objectively, 31 NEW
ATLANTIS 136 (2011) (reviewing DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE:
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010)), https://www.thenewatla
ntis.com/publications/the-challenge-of-regulating-objectively
[https://perma.cc/M58JFHK2] (“The core argument [against cost-benefit analysis] is that cost-benefit calculations
are incapable of capturing the full range of ethical, aesthetic, and other concerns that should
motivate regulatory decision-making . . . .”).
30
Id. at 143.
31
See generally MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006) (presenting one of the more thoughtful, though ultimately
supportive, critiques of cost-benefit analysis); see also Amy Sinden, Douglas A. Kysar &
David M. Driesen, Cost–Benefit Analysis: New Foundations on Shifting Sand, 3 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 48 (2009) (reviewing ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATION) (suggesting that
given the limitations of cost-benefit analyses (CBAs), other decision-making tools might be
preferable).
32
See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (discussing the troubling
problem of placing a value on human life, although that is not likely to pose a significant
issue for implementing a public interest standard in the context of water rights).
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these questions, a utilitarian or cost-benefit approach tends to minimize and
sometimes even disregard current and future public values that are commonly
shared, in favor of private and present economic values.33 Many see this as a
distorted view of the public interest.34
Finally, a utilitarian approach fails to subjectively consider who benefits. A
public interest definition that maximizes net benefits but fails to address distributive
justice35 concerns will be difficult to defend. For example, a decision that grants a
handful of industrial users control over finite water resources might maximize
overall wealth, but if these users dry up a river and thereby deprive the general public
of access to water to meet basic human needs, as well as their traditional rights to
fish and recreate in the river, then such a decision hardly seems to be in the public
interest—at least if the “public” is understood to encompass society as a whole.
B. The Pluralist View of the Public Interest
Somewhat related to the utilitarian approach to defining public interest is the
pluralist view, which seeks to aggregate the individual preferences of interested
parties and filter those views through a political or democratic process.36 This
33

See FLATHMAN, supra note 24, at 33–37 (making the moral argument that, while
individuals are usually motivated by self-interest, they should sometimes support policies
that are contrary to their own self-interest yet support the greater public interest). Flathman
criticizes scholars, most notably Jeremy Bentham, who define the public interest by
aggregating individual interests. Id.; see also BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION supra note 26,
at 12 (“It is in vain to talk of the interest of the community, without understanding what is
the interest of the individual. A thing is said to promote the interest, or to be for the interest,
of an individual, when it tends to add to the sum total of his pleasures: or, what comes to the
same thing, to diminish the sum total of his pains.”). Nonetheless, Flathman acknowledges
that individual interest “is to be highly valued, fostered, and protected as a means of
strengthening the body politic.” FLATHHAM, supra note 24, at 37.
34
See Sinden et al., supra note 31, at 62; see also Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling,
Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 PENN L. REV.
1553, 1567 (2002); Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, 5
REGULATION 33, 36–37 (1981).
35
See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (addressing the problem
of distributive justice and defining the concept as the socially just distribution of goods in a
society).
36
Bentham arguably supports this approach, as well as pure utilitarianism. He argues,
for example, that “[t]he interest of the community then is, what?—the sum of the interests of
the several members who compose it.” BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 26, at 12.
Bentham further defines the “principle of utility” as the “principle which approves or
disapproves of every action whatsoever.” Id. at 11–12. Individuals and political leaders alike
determine the principle of utility by summing the pleasure and pain of an action to determine
if the action produces a beneficial result. Id. at 12. This process of summing pain and pleasure
works on both the individual and communal level. Id. Bentham stresses, “It is in vain to talk
of the interest of the community without understanding what is the interest of the individual.”
Id. Understanding the interest of a communal “body” begins by understanding the individual
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framework privileges majoritarian views, as determined either by popular vote or
the vote of elected representatives.37
As a practical matter, legislatures can and sometimes do define the public
interest, thereby establishing a legal standard that limits the discretion and influence
of policymakers in the executive branch.38 But legislative choices made by elected
officials in a representative democracy may or may not reflect majoritarian views,
and might be more in step with utilitarian or communal principles (as described in
Sections A and C of this Part, respectively). Moreover, such choices often seem
incoherent because they lack fealty to any precise theory or principle. Indeed,
legislatures can announce radically different versions of the public interest that are
more reflective of political views and the influence of well-financed lobbyists and
politically connected participants in the decision-making process. This is essentially
what happened with the FCC’s net neutrality rules.39
A pluralist approach also suffers from being both unpredictable and unstable.
Indeed, unlike the utilitarian or communal approaches, pluralism makes no pretense
of seeking an objective understanding of the public interest, focusing instead on the
values and preferences of those individuals allowed to engage in the decision process
as aggregated by the decision-maker. 40 And because decision-makers are typically
interests that shape that body; after understanding individual interests the community’s
interest is then “the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it.” Id.
37
For a general review of pluralist approaches in the political sphere, see Richard
Bellamy, Dealing with Difference: Four Models of Pluralist Politics, 53 PARLIAMENTARY
AFFAIRS 198 (2000).
38
See, for example, the definition of the public interest in the Alaska Water Use Act,
which asks the agency decision-maker to balance a range of public and private interests in
deciding whether to issue a water permit. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (2019). The statute
provides that the state water commissioner should issue a water permit only if he finds,
among other things, that the issuance of the permit is in the public interest. In determining
the public interest, the commissioner must consider:
(1) the benefit to the applicant resulting from the proposed appropriation; (2) the
effect of the economic activity resulting from the proposed appropriation; (3) the
effect on fish and game resources and on public recreational opportunities; (4) the
effect on public health; (5) the effect of loss of alternate uses of water that might
be made within a reasonable time if not precluded or hindered by the proposed
appropriation; (6) harm to other persons resulting from the proposed
appropriation; (7) the intent and ability of the applicant to complete the
appropriation; and (8) the effect upon access to navigable or public water.
Id.
39

See supra Part II; see also Timothy Karr, Exposing D.C.’s Anti-Democratic
Opposition to Net Neutrality, FREEPRESS (June 19, 2019), https://www.freepress.net/ourresponse/expert-analysis/explainers/exposing-dcs-anti-democratic-opposition-net-neutrality
[https://perma.cc/NGW9-GJ29].
40
See Bellamy, supra note 37.
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elected or appointed, they are constantly changing. With shifts in power come
different political and ideological views about how to define the public interest.41 In
this sense, the public interest may not reflect the public’s interests at all, but instead
the interests of rent-seekers42 who are able to commandeer the political and agency
decision-making processes.
Like utilitarianism, pluralism also tends to favor present interests over those of
future generations because it essentially responds to time-sensitive pressure from
interested parties and organizations.43 It is entirely possible—if not likely—that
some of these parties will promote the protection of both public values and the needs
of future generations. Still, it is difficult to imagine that such arguments will prevail
over the demands made by present users, especially for those water resources facing
significant stress. Concerted lobbying efforts of water-intensive industries, such as
agriculture, for example, tend to overpower concerns raised by individual members
of the public.44 The experience in many places where streams have been entirely
dewatered by private, consumptive uses would appear to bear out the observation
that communal values often receive short shrift when water resources are claimed
chiefly for private uses.45
41

The constant turnover in elected officials and agency leadership has prompted some
scholars to favor judicial application of the Public Trust Doctrine for water resources rather
than the public interest standard found in legislation. See Michelle Bryan Mudd, Hitching
Our Wagon to a Dim Star: Why Outmoded Water Codes and the Public Interest Review
Cannot Protect the Public Trust in Western Water Law, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 307
(2013).
42
“Rent seeking is the attempt by particular groups to persuade governments to grant
them . . . valuable monopolies or legal privileges. If their rent seeking is successful, such
benefits could add up to a substantial transfer of wealth to these privileged groups from the
general public.” EAMONN BUTLER, PUBLIC CHOICE – A PRIMER 76 (2012).
43
See Bellamy, supra note 37.
44
See, e.g., Noah Gallagher Shannon, The Water Wars of Arizona, N.Y. TIMES (July
19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/magazine/the-water-wars-of-arizona.html
[https://perma.cc/M2LJ-MUU9] (chronicling the experiences of rural landowners in Arizona
who are unable to access groundwater to meet even their most basic needs due to the
depletion of local aquifers). Industrial irrigation is responsible for 70% of the water
withdrawn from aquifers in the region, but residents “felt there were too many forces already
marshaled against them, including the state’s strong agriculture and ranching lobbies,” to
change local policies. Id.
45
See, e.g., River, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyc
lopedia/river/ [https://perma.cc/P29V-UCWF] (last visited Nov. 10, 2019) (“An unsettling
number of large rivers—including the Colorado, Rio Grande, Yellow, Indus, Ganges, Amu
Darya, Murray, and Nile—are now so overtapped that they discharge little or no water to the
sea for months at a time.”); Laura Paskus, Time’s Out for the Rio, SANTA FE REP. (Apr. 15,
2014),
https://www.sfreporter.com/news/coverstories/2014/04/15/times-out-for-the-rio/
[https://perma.cc/LQ5K-SRYJ] (“It doesn’t take driving 1,000 miles south of Pilar to Texas,
where about 400 miles of the Rio Grande are almost always dry, to see sandy riverbed. Just
look south of Albuquerque between June and the end of October. Last year, about 30 miles
dried.”).
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C. Public Interest as Shared Communal and Societal Values
A third theory views the public interest as solely reflective of shared communal
and societal values. The essence of this approach is recognizing that public interests
are distinctly different from private interests and describing the communal aspect of
the public interest in normative, values-based terms.46 A communal perspective of
the public interest acknowledges the value of private interests in common resources,
but only to the extent that the shared, public values of those resources are protected
first.47
This theory might seem particularly anomalous in the context of traditional
Lockean notions of private property,48 but it finds strong support in the water
resources context for two reasons. First, the property at issue is water, which—unlike
land—is traditionally viewed as public property.49 Water users acquire a
usufructuary50 right in water, but nothing more.51 Second, notions of property that
informed the early architects of the American experiment—and that trace their

46
Communal values include trans-subjective values that are devoid of self-interest and
can be “justifiably imposed” on all members of a community, particularly in instances when
there are two competing interests. FLATHMAN, supra note 24, at 37–42. These communal
values are determined by filtering context-specific information, making the public interest
incorporate a procedural component further described in the next paragraph. Id. When
assessing if a policy can be justifiably imposed, public interest review depends on what
Flathman calls the principle of “generalization.” Id. Policy typically affects particular
groups—or “classes”—of individuals. Id. at 70–72. The principle of generalization dictates
that a policy can be justifiably imposed on all members of a particular class. Id.
47
The word “first” should be emphasized here because it has particular application to
water law in the American West. In many Western states, the prior appropriation doctrine
can cause certain State-held water rights to be subject to private uses, even if those uses
violate the communal values held by the State’s citizens.
48
See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 213 (2d ed. 1887),
(“[L]abour . . . gave a right of property, wherever anyone was pleased to employ it upon what
was common . . . .”).
49
Water as public property is a common refrain in the constitutions of western states.
See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 (“The water of every natural stream, not heretofore
appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public,
and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state . . . .”).
50
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “usufruct” as “[a] right for a certain period to use
and enjoy the fruits of another’s property without damaging or diminishing it, but allowing
for any natural deterioration in the property over time.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2019). In the case of water, one can acquire a property right to use it, but title to the water
itself remains vested in the State. See, e.g., In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065, 1096 (Or. 1924).
(In Oregon, “[t]he owner [of a water right] has no property in the water itself, but a simple
usufruct. The [Oregon] Water Code declares the waters of the state to be public property.”
(internal citations omitted)).
51
See Spear T. Ranch v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116, 127 (Neb. 2005) (“A right to
appropriate surface water . . . is not an ownership of property.”).
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origins back to Aristotle52—suggest stronger support for egalitarian notions of
property rights than John Locke might have preferred, with a concomitant focus on
the common good. Thomas Jefferson, for example, expressed a view of property that
was far more circumspect about rights of inheritance and alienability. In Jefferson’s
view, it is society that creates and thus ultimately controls property rights.53 Jefferson
thought it “self-evident” that “the earth belongs to the living in usufruct; that the
dead have neither power nor rights over it.”54 Whatever one thinks of Jefferson’s
“self-evident” claim, it seems remarkably salient in the context of water rights,
where public ownership is the norm, and where private rights are commonly
understood as usufructuary.
Gregory Alexander offers further support for the idea that public and private
interests are distinct. In Commodity & Propriety, Alexander argues that “the core of
American republican thought during the eighteenth century was the idea that private
‘interests’ could and should be subordinated to the common welfare of the polity.”55
In making his case, he reflects on how early Americans embraced a view of the
public good distinct from private interests:
The holistic conception of society made the notion of the public good as
the central objective of political life intelligible. . . . The common good
then, was not merely what the consensus of society’s individual members
wished, but a substantive conception of the moral good that transcended
individual interests . . . .56
In Public Rights and Private Interests,57 Hannah Arendt takes an approach to
the public interest not unlike Alexander’s. Arendt argues that public rights and the
public interest must be understood as distinct from private rights and private
interests. As Arendt explains, the public interest is more than a sum of private
interests.58 On the contrary, the public sphere is inherently distinct from, and often
at odds with, private values and rights:
These two, the private and the public, must be considered separately, for
the aims and chief concerns in each case are different. Throughout his life
man moves constantly in two different orders of existence: he moves
within what is his own, and he also moves in a sphere that is common to
him and his fellowmen. The “public good,” the concerns of the citizen, is
52

GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY 29 (1997).
Id. at 27.
54
Id. at 26.
55
Id. at 29.
56
Id.
57
Hannah Arendt, Public Rights and Private Interests: In Response to Charles Frankel,
in SMALL COMFORTS FOR HARD TIMES: HUMANISTS ON PUBLIC POLICY 103, 103–04
(Michael J. Mooney & Florian Stuber eds., 1977).
58
Id. at 103.
53
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indeed the common good because it is localized in the world which we
have in common without owning it. The reckless pursuit of private
interests in the public-political sphere is as ruinous for the public good as
the arrogant attempts of governments to regulate the private lives of their
citizens are ruinous for private happiness.59
Arendt thus sees the public sphere as a world beyond the self. All citizens—
including those who came before us and those who will come after us—share in this
public space, and all must suppress their private interests to enjoy it.60
Arendt acknowledges the difficulty of premising the public interest upon the
suppression of one’s own private interests. This task requires that individuals act
impartially, and Arendt notes that “such impartiality . . . is resisted at every turn by
the urgency of one’s self-interests, which are always more urgent than the common
good.”61 But she sees such resistance as necessary to preserve public values. In a
civil society, people must sacrifice certain individual interests to promote shared,
communal values.62 When private interests are allowed to influence the public realm,
common values are sacrificed for personal values.
In seeking to shield the public interest from private intrusions, Arendt
acknowledges the important role of private interests in a modern society.63 But she
insists that private interests in common resources must yield to the shared, public
values of those resources and that these public values must be protected first: “What
is necessary for the public realm is that it be shielded from the private interest which
have intruded upon it in the most brutal and aggressive form.”64
Although not written to explain the public interest in water resources
management, Arendt’s understanding of the public interest as a common good, her
recognition of the challenge posed by self-interest, and her articulation of the proper
place for private interests in a public interest analysis fit surprisingly well into the
water resources paradigm.65 The most basic public or communal value associated
59

Id. at 103–04 (emphasis in original).
See Maurizio Passerin d’Entreves, Hannah Arendt, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
(Jan. 11, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arendt/ [https://perma.cc/RQ3R-C6MR].
61
Arendt, supra note 57, at 105.
62
Arendt points to the example of the juror to illustrate her point. When called upon
for jury duty, each of us is asked to set aside our private feelings and administer justice as
neutrally as possible. Id. at 104–05.
63
See, e.g., Suzanne Duvall Jacobitti, The Public, the Private, the Moral: Hannah
Arendt and Political Morality, 12 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 281, 287 (1991) (noting that Arendt
“was not hostile to the private sphere”).
64
Arendt, supra note 57, at 108.
65
Arendt’s understanding of the public interest is firmly grounded within the liberal
tradition. See id. For example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau spoke of a “general will” that
encompassed only common interests. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 58
(Christopher Betts trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1762). As opposed to “the will of all,”
the general will was not merely a sum of individual interests but rather a set of shared values
that transcended a person’s particular station. Id. at 62. To Rousseau, the general will was
60
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with water resources is for meeting essential human needs. But it also includes such
things as ecological health, aesthetic values, and recreational opportunities for
fishing, boating, and swimming. The prospective value of water resources to future
communal users should play a role as well.
Protecting the communal values associated with water resources does not mean
that public interest demands are absolute. Accommodating other uses of water will
often be necessary and can usually be done without unduly compromising public
values. But a water resources law that is supposed to protect the public interest
should ensure an appropriate level of protection for public values before private
rights are even considered.
A useful strategy for persuading decision-makers about the merits of protecting
communal values in water before protecting private rights might employ John
Rawls’ “veil of ignorance.”66 Rawls’ thought experiment asks parties to assume an
original position where “no one knows his place in society, his class position or
social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets
and abilities, his intelligence, strength and the like.”67 If all parties were to define
the public interest from behind the veil of ignorance, they would be more likely to
support communal interests that benefit society broadly, as opposed to private
interests that would benefit only the privileged few.68
A Rawlsian approach to the public interest in the water resources context might
identify appropriate baselines for protecting communal values in water. As
preeminent and could not be contradicted. Id. In fact, the social contract hinged on each
citizen putting “his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the
general will.” Id. at 55. Rousseau’s forebearer, John Locke, described a similar concept that
he termed the “publick good.” JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 278 (1st ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690). While leaving the term undefined, Locke insisted that
legislators must act in the public good rather than acting to promote private interests, and his
writing suggested at least one shared value that might be encompassed within the public
good—the basic sustenance of all men. Id. at 303–06; see Jeffrey M. Gaba, John Locke and
the Meaning of the Takings Clause, 72 MO. L. REV. 525, 538–39 (2007).
66
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136–42 (1971). This “veil of ignorance” strategy
was suggested by Stefano Moroni in the context of planning theory. See Stefano Moroni,
Towards a Reconstruction of the Public Interest Criterion, 3 PLAN. THEORY 151, 163 (2004).
67
RAWLS, supra note 66, at 137.
68
In this way, Rawls uses the veil of ignorance to show his clear preference for a
political approach that emphasizes communal values over simply maximizing private
benefits. He believes that the utilitarian approach leads to an unacceptable distributional
inequity that allows some men to prosper but denies other men fundamental baseline
interests: “Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of
society as a whole cannot override.” Id. at 3. The veil of ignorance, therefore, is helpful in
identifying the certain interests that all men ought to be afforded in society. Rawls’ work
echoes the ethos of Immanuel Kant, who also believed that men only ought to act in a manner
that would be consistent, regardless of his station in society: “I ought never to act except in
such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.” IMMANUEL
KANT, THE MORAL LAW 74 (H.J. Paton trans., Routledge Classics 1948).
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suggested above, these baselines might include, for example, water to meet basic
human needs, minimum instream flows or lake levels, minimum water quality
standards, and minimum ecological health standards. Again, private water rights and
uses would be allowed and fully expected under this system. But, as Arendt suggests,
private rights should only be recognized after the primary public interests are
protected and preserved.69
The public interest, of course, is an inherently dynamic concept. Accordingly,
an adaptive mechanism should be built into any definition to allow for efficient
changes as values change and as new information becomes available that better
informs public needs and how to protect them. A dynamic conception of the public
interest is particularly important for managing water resources where water supplies
can fluctuate wildly due to droughts, floods, and climate change. While some
academics and policymakers might prefer the more certain posture of a static public
interest, all can take comfort from the fact that changes to the public’s understanding
of communal needs evolves slowly—and, for the most part, predictably—as new
information becomes available and as societal values evolve.70
IV. A PROCESS FOR DEFINING THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Even if interested parties could agree that the public interest should be defined
in terms of communal values, the nature and scope of those communal values—and
the manner in which they should be protected under a public interest standard—must
still be fleshed out. The key question to be answered here is what procedural norms
should be adopted to achieve both a good outcome and one that will be embraced,
or at least accepted, by the public as a legitimate reflection of public interest values.
The procedural norms to which I refer include: (1) appropriate advance notice of a
proposal, or a pre-proposal; (2) one or more opportunities for meaningful civic
engagement through written comments and public meetings or hearings; (3) a
decision process that transparently reflects how the decision-maker responded to
significant comments from the public; and (4) a process for review of the final
decision by an impartial arbiter. Such procedures can help policymakers collect and
process context-specific information used to identify and assess communal values,
and ultimately to define the public interest.71
A process, of course, is only as good as its implementation. In an excellent
essay aimed at reconciling the public interest with environmental philosophy, Ben
Minteer argues for defining the public interest through a deliberative process,
following an approach advocated by the American philosopher John Dewey.72
69

See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying discussion.
See generally Ben A. Minteer, Environmental Philosophy and the Public Interest: A
Pragmatic Reconciliation, 14 ENVTL. VALUES 37 (2005); Grant, Two Models, supra note 28.
71
FLATHMAN, supra note 24, at 53–63.
72
See generally Minteer, supra note 70, at 44–49; see also François-Pierre Gauvin,
Nat’l Collaborating Ctr. for Healthy Pub. Pol’y, What Is a Deliberative Process?, Pub. No.
1193
(Oct.
2009),
http://www.ncchpp.ca/docs/DeliberativeDoc1_EN_pdf.pdf
70
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Although Dewey does not mention the term, and Minteer mentions it only in passing,
both seem to favor a process with robust give-and-take that reflects the civic
republican ideal.73 Cass Sunstein has described civic republicanism as embracing a
deliberative process that promotes political equality for the purpose of achieving a
definable common good; where engaged parties sublimate their private interests and
instead act as citizens committed to achieving the public interest.74 As described by
Sunstein, civic republicanism offers a seemingly perfect framework for identifying
the public interest in water resources.
While civic republicanism seems an obvious choice for developing a public
interest standard, it must be approached with care due to the very real risk that it
might be co-opted by special interests. More specifically, civic republicanism is
quite rightly described as an “ideal,” meaning that it cannot be fully realized in the
real world.75 Try as they might, people do not generally sublimate their private
interests or the interests of their clients when engaged in deliberative processes, even
when they are asked to do so (and perhaps even when they honestly try to do so).
On the contrary, public choice theory predicts, with some reliability, that powerful
and concentrated private interests are likely to overwhelm the more diffuse public
interest in civic engagement processes.76
If the public choice problem is real, then the best solution for this problem is to
ask the agency decision-maker to rise above the fray and make a choice that, in the

[https://perma.cc/9RRQ-PPQN]; JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 207 (1927)
(“A class of experts . . . is so removed from common interests as to become a class with
private interests and private knowledge, which in social matters is not knowledge at all.”).
73
See Minteer, supra note 70, at 47–49; see also Win McCormack, Are You
Progressive?, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 20, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/147825
/progressive-vital-term-us-political-life-lost-significance [https://perma.cc/7CLS-QHW5].
McCormack describes Dewey’s philosophy as “an ongoing deliberative process through
which bearers of individual rights address issues facing their political community as a whole
and chart its future together.” Id. According to McCormack, Dewey “redefined, in other
words, the ‘negative rights’ of liberalism and the ‘positive rights’ of civic republicanism as
mutual necessities.” Id.
74
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1544–45
(1988); see also Mark Squillace, Embracing a Civic Republican Tradition in Natural
Resources Decision-Making, in THE EVOLUTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY
195 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates eds., 2010).
75
See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992) (discussing how government can be structured to achieve
the civic republican ideal); David A. Martin, The Civic Republican Ideal for Citizenship, and
for Our Common Life, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 301, 306–07 (1994).
76
See EAMONN BUTLER, PUBLIC CHOICE—A PRIMER 58–59 (2012); JAMES BUCHANAN
& GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 285–88 (1962); Earl Latham, The Group
Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory, 46 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 376 (1952) (addressing the
dynamic of public versus private interest in policy decisions).
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mind of the decision-maker, best reflects societal values and public needs, as
informed by the best information available, including information derived through a
meaningful and deliberative public process.
Acknowledging the essential role of the decision-maker in carrying out the
challenging task of ascertaining an objective, normative “public interest,” not unduly
influenced by private interests, lends further support for adhering to a view of the
public interest that reflects communal values as promoted above. This is because
both the utilitarian and pluralist approaches described above play to the strengths of
the rent-seeking77 proclivities of concentrated private interests. The loudest and most
influential voices in a process that follows one of these approaches can easily
overwhelm those voices representing the public interest in the common, shared
values of water resources. While this risk is not entirely absent from a process that
focuses on communal values, it is far less likely to intrude into the agency decision
because private interests are theoretically off the table.
The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that, at least in the context of
water resources management, the public interest should ultimately reflect communal
values—as ascertained by the relevant water management agency or officials
following a meaningful and deliberative public process that embodies the civic
republican ideal.
V. DISTINGUISHING THE PUBLIC INTEREST FROM THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The roots of the public trust doctrine (PTD) run deep, tracing back at least to
the time of the Emperor Justinian and the “Institutes” or code that bears his name.
In the Book of Things, the Justinian Code provides as follows:
1. By the law of nature these things are common to mankind—the air,
running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea. No one,
therefore, is forbidden to approach the seashore . . . .
2. All rivers and ports are public; hence the right of fishing in a port, or in
rivers, is common to all men.
3. The seashore extends as far as the greatest winter flood runs up.
4. The public use of the banks of a river is part of the law of nations, just
as is that of the river itself . . . .78
Public rights of use are thus the hallmark of the PTD, and accordingly, the PTD
has much in common with the public interest. At its core, it protects public rights in
communal water-related resources, including public use of the shore and the bed of
waterways, the rights of fishing and public access, and perhaps even the right to the
77

See BUTLER, supra note 76, at 76. Butler describes “rent seeking” as “the attempt by
particular groups to persuade governments to grant them these sorts of valuable monopolies
or legal privileges.” Id.
78
J. INST. 2.1.1–.4 (J.B. Moyle trans. Oxford, 1911).
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water itself for certain communal uses.79 These might fairly be seen as public interest
values.
But the public interest in water paints a wider swath that is not tied entirely to
the water or waterway. It might include, for example, opportunity costs, equitable
or distributive justice80 concerns, economic factors, and cultural considerations.
Moreover, unlike the PTD—which, as part of the common law protects public trust
values independently of any other government action, the public interest in water
resources functions (or at least should function) as a specific factor to be assessed in
any decision that allocates, reallocates, or manages water resources. 81
The two concepts also differ in how they are invoked. While the PTD has
historically been grounded in the common law, the public interest in water arises
specifically and almost universally from positive law. Thus, as a common law
doctrine, the recognition of the PTD is advanced through litigation. The public
interest, by contrast, typically arises in the context of public deliberation and
participation during the administrative decision-making process.82
Notwithstanding these differences, I fully concede that states can protect public
values in water resources through either or both the public trust doctrine and a public
interest review of water rights. Scholars have written extensively about the public
trust doctrine and its potential for embracing newfound public values, such as
ecosystem services and recreational opportunities.83 In 1983, the California Supreme
Court gave voice to this idea in its famous decision in National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court84—commonly called the Mono Lake case. In the Mono Lake
decision, the court invoked the public trust doctrine to hold that longstanding water

79

State laws and constitutions commonly provide for state ownership of water
resources on behalf of the people of the state. States then, arguably hold their water resources
as trustee for the people. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.
1983).
80
As used here, distributive justice refers to the fair distribution of goods—in this case,
water and access to water—among all members of a society.
81
As a normative standard mandated by positive law, the public interest ought to
permeate all aspects of agency decisions involving the management of water resources.
82
See, e.g., Brian Maffly, Environmentalists, Feds, and Utahns Agree: Don’t Send
Green River Water to Colorado, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://www.sltrib.com/news/environment/2018/11/08/finally-something/ [https://perma.cc
/K996-EQEN] (discussing participation of multiple stakeholders in hearing arguing against
proposed interstate water project, citing the effect on public recreation and instream flows).
83
See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public
Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecologic
Public Trust, 37 ECOL. L.Q. 71 (2010); Mudd, supra note 41, at 291–92; Joseph L. Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH.
L. REV. 471, 475 (1970).
84
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
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rights possessed by the City of Los Angeles did not bar the State from affording
some protection for public values in the Lake, including the adverse ecological
impacts of water withdrawals by the City from tributaries feeding Mono Lake.85
Still, the Mono Lake decision arguably conflates common law public trust
doctrine with the positive law, public interest standard. Indeed, as applied in Mono
Lake, the PTD has much more in common with the public interest than with its
common law antecedents,86 and it thus offers a useful framework for applying public
interest criteria in the review of water rights applications.
To the extent that the PTD has, in fact, evolved to encompass values that are or
should have been historically protected by the public interest, including those
inherent in the water resources themselves, I recognize and acknowledge their likely
overlap. For purposes of this Article, however, the public interest is distinguished
from the traditional common law public trust doctrine, and the following analysis
focuses only on the former.
VI. DISTINGUISHING THE PUBLIC INTEREST FROM INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION
An additional distinction that must be acknowledged is that between public
interest review and instream flow protection. Protecting minimum instream flows87
85

Id. at 728. The court found that the State of California had an “affirmative duty” to
protect public trust values in water resources including scenic and ecological values. Id.
Somewhat controversially, the court held that “[i]n exercising its sovereign power to allocate
water resources in the public interest, the state is not confined by past allocation decisions
which may be incorrect in light of current knowledge or inconsistent with current needs.” Id.
86
Indeed, to support its PTD holding, the Court invokes a California statute that
requires the State Water Board to account for “[t]he use of water for recreation and
preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife resources . . . when it is in the public
interest” when making water allocation decisions. Id. at 726 (emphasis added) (quoting CAL.
WATER CODE § 1243 (West 1959)). The Court also cites a second provision that authorizes
the Board to establish terms and conditions for appropriations “as in its judgment will best
develop, conserve, and utilize in the public interest, the water sought to be appropriated.” Id.
(emphasis added) (quoting CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 1969)).
87

In the simplest terms, instream flow is the water flowing in a stream
channel . . . This simple concept belies the difficulty of determining what that
flow should be among competing uses for water, such as irrigation, public supply,
recreation, hydropower, and aquatic habitat. The simple definition may not
account for variations in flow levels across different seasons and wet, dry, and
normal years. A challenge facing natural resource managers is to find a workable
balance among these demands and use appropriate methods to quantify instream
flow needs for each of these uses.
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, THE SCIENCE OF INSTREAM FLOWS: A REVIEW OF THE
TEXAS INSTREAM FLOW PROGRAM 32 (2005), https://www.nap.edu/read/11197/chapter/5
[https://perma.cc/G63M-5PRL].
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for recreational, ecological, and aesthetic purposes is plainly the kind of public value
that might normally be considered under the public interest, as I use that term in this
Article. Yet many Western states purporting to protect the public interest in water
nonetheless require that, in order to protect uses that depend on a minimum instream
flow, the State or private parties must first acquire water rights for instream flow
purposes by standing in line with other appropriators. This arguably turns the public
interest assessment on its head.
Consider, for example, the Wyoming Constitution, which demands that the
State deny water rights that are contrary to the public interest.88 This requirement is
reinforced by a provision in the Wyoming statutes governing water rights
applications, which declare that, where a proposed water use “threatens to prove
detrimental to the public interest, it shall be the duty of the state engineer to reject
such application . . . .”89 If this requirement were enforced based upon a reasonable
interpretation of the public interest as described above, then presumably water rights
would be conditioned on preserving minimum stream flows, and Wyoming would
not need a separate program to acquire and protect instream flows. Yet, as will be
described in Part VIII, Wyoming routinely ignores the public interest standard
enshrined in its water law, and thus fails even to consider—let alone protect—public
values in the state’s waters.
In 1986, Wyoming did adopt its own instream flow law, which allows the State
Game and Fish Commission to recommend the issuance of instream flow permits in
the name of the State for the limited purpose of protecting fisheries.90 But, as with
other water rights, instream flow rights hold a priority date as of the date of the
application, which means that private water rights with earlier priority dates may
lawfully deny water needed to protect minimum stream flows.91
While instream flow laws such as the one adopted by the State of Wyoming
have done much to protect stream flows, they have also faced many challenges.92
And these challenges would simply not arise if states were committed to a fulsome
88

WYO. CONST. art. XIII, § 3.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-503. (2019). See also the comparable provisions on
groundwater at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-932(c) (2019).
90
1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws 140 (codified at WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-1001–10014
(2019)). The State Game and Fish Department, which manages instream flow segments in
the State acknowledges that the State has thus far protected “just over 2 percent of all stream
miles in the state.” See Instream Flow Information, WYO. GAME & FISH DEP’T,
https://wgfd.wyo.gov/Fishing-and-Boating/Instream-Flow-XStream-Angler [https://perma.
cc/KG52-KV8K] (last visited July 24, 2018). If water rights were conditioned on protecting
stream flows up front many more miles would likely be protected without the need for
priority dates and instream flow designations.
91
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-1007 (2019).
92
See generally Adell L. Amos & Christopher R. Swenson, Evaluating Instream Flow
Programs: Innovative Approaches and Persistent Challenges in the Western United States,
61 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL L. FOUND. 22-1 (2015) (analyzing the different challenges
facing several western states’ instream flow laws).
89
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application of public interest standards. Instead, the protection of minimum stream
flows and other public values would be imposed as a condition of approving any
water rights, as is done in a few states like California.93 This approach honors the
primary role of the public interest in water resources management, allowing private
rights in water only after these public rights are protected. Not only would statutes
like the Wyoming instream flow law become unnecessary, but they might actually
be seen as counterproductive since they threaten to compromise public interest rights
on the altar of priorities.
Perhaps it is too late in the day to be claiming public interest rights in the face
of a long history of state decisions that granted vested water rights without actually
protecting public interest values. But, as the California Supreme Court demonstrated
in the Mono Lake case, public rights in water that appear to have been lost as a result
of prior appropriations can be reclaimed, at least in part, when courts acknowledge
a legal duty to protect public values in water.94 And decision-makers and courts can
protect these values even as they limitedly consider the ramifications of upsetting
senior appropriators’ settled expectations.95
In contrast to the Wyoming approach to instream flow protection, a few states
have chosen to protect stream flows outside of the priority system.96 The State of
Washington offers perhaps the best examples of this more robust model that uses
the public interest standard to protect instream flows and arguably other public
values. Like most Western states, Washington has positive law requiring it to deny
any application that “threatens to prove detrimental to the public interest.”97
Washington’s Water Resources Act of 1971 reinforces this requirement in the
context of instream flows by mandating that minimum base flows be protected when
approving applications. And where conflicts arise, applications should only be
approved if “it is clear that overriding considerations of the public interest will be
served.”98 To implement this policy, water permits in Washington are reviewed by
93

See CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 2019).
See generally Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
95
See, e.g., id. at 363.
96
California and Washington are the primary examples. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1257;
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.290(3) (2019).
97
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.290(3).
98
The quality of the natural environment shall be protected and, where possible,
enhanced as follows:
94

(a) Perennial rivers and streams of the state shall be retained with base flows necessary
to provide for preservation of wildlife, fish, scenic, aesthetic and other environmental
values, and navigational values. Lakes and ponds shall be retained substantially in their
natural condition. Withdrawals of water which would conflict therewith shall be
authorized only in those situations where it is clear that overriding considerations of the
public interest will be served.
(b) Waters of the state shall be of high quality.
Id. § 90.54.020(3).
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the Department of Ecology, the same agency that manages the State’s environmental
program.99 This institutional structure seems to facilitate the State’s willingness to
place conditions on water permits to protect instream flows, which makes other
forms of streamflow protection unnecessary.
VII. THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE
Modern Western water law evolved from the legal systems established in the
nineteenth century mining camps of the Western United States.100 Until at least
1866,101 the miners were technically trespassers on federal public lands. Partly
because the federal government lacked a significant presence in the Western United
States during the middle part of the nineteenth century, the miners established
mining camps with a local government structure that set out rules for allocating
mineral rights.102 The basic principle that evolved was to protect the first person who
discovered a valuable mineral deposit and diligently worked toward its
development.103 As miners came to realize that they would need substantial amounts
of water to process their claimed mineral resources, they also learned that water
resources in the West were relatively scarce. 104
The common law riparian system that existed throughout the country at the time
tied water rights to riparian land ownership.105 This system was of little use to miners
because it lacked certainty in terms of the availability of the water supply.106
Consequently, miners quickly adapted their system for allocating mineral rights to
apply to water allocation decisions as well; hence, “first in time, first in right.”107
When agrarian settlers followed the miners out West, they saw the advantage that
the prior appropriation doctrine offered them as well.108 As the earliest settlers, they

99

Id. § 90.54.020(1); see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-173-050 (2019).
See A. DAN TARLOCK, JAMES N. CORBRIDGE, JR., DAVID H. GETCHES & REED D.
BENSON, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 76
(6th ed. 2009).
101
Congress first provided for the private acquisition of public mineral lands in the
Lode Law of 1866. See R. S. § 2339, ch. 262 § 1–2, 14 Stat. 251, 251 (1866).
102
See JOHN LESHY, THE MINING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL MOTION 13 (1987) (“In
the mining camps themselves, the miners had worked out, in the best democratic tradition,
their own system for determining rights and obligations in the exploitation of a resource to
which they had no legal claim.”).
103
See CHERYL OUTERBRIDGE ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 4.09 (2d ed. 2011)
[hereinafter AMERICAN LAW OF MINING].
104
See Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV.
317, 318–19 (1985).
105
1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 6.01(a.01).
106
See TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 100, at 83.
107
See WELLS A. HUTCHINS, 1 WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN NINETEEN WESTERN STATES
164 (1971).
108
See TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 100, at 83.
100
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could secure for themselves the most valuable lands and water rights, and thus
protect themselves from claims brought by future settlers.109
As the nineteenth century wore on, the federal government adopted laws that
effectively acquiesced in the legal structure established for the mining camps,
including their rules for the appropriation of water.110 And as the Western territories
achieved statehood, the new states built into their constitutions the basic tenets of
the prior appropriation doctrine.111
Even as prior appropriation came to dominate the water law of the Western
United States, the states uniformly recognized that water resources were public
assets. The 1876 Colorado Constitution, for example, provides that “[t]he water of
every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated . . . is hereby declared to be the
property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state
. . . .”112 Thus, while the states guaranteed the right of private parties to claim water
rights based upon priority, they retained the authority to manage the water resources,
at least in part to protect the public rights inherent in the water. As part of that
management, every Western state has established a comprehensive permitting
scheme to govern the acquisition and administration of water rights.113 With the
notable exception of Colorado, which adopted a system of water courts,114 executive
branch agencies administer these water allocation programs.115
The prominent state role in the administration of water rights led the noted trial
lawyer, Moses Lasky, to declare approvingly in 1929 that “prior-appropriation is the
law nowhere in the West.”116 To be sure, “allowing settlers to appropriate water . . .
109

Id.
For example, “An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners Over
the Public Lands” provides that:
110

Whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining,
agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued, and the
same are recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and the
decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be
maintained and protected in the same; and the right of way for the construction of
ditches and canals for the purposes herein specified is acknowledged and
confirmed . . . .
Act of July 26, 1866, R. S. § 2339, ch. 262, §9, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (1866) (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 661 (2018)).
111
See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §5; WYO. CONST. art. XIII, §5.
112
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
113
See TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 100, at 295.
114
Id.
115
See JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN, MARK SQUILLACE, & SAMUEL KALEN,
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 879 (3d ed. 2016) (“Colorado is the only
appropriation state that never adopted a statutory permit procedure.”).
116
Moses Lasky, From Prior Appropriation to Economic Distribution of Water by the
State—Via Irrigation Administration, 1 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 161, 170 (1929).
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with no record of title or rights, could not stand.”117 But, as Lasky saw it, the water
law of the Western states was designed not only to protect priorities but also the
public values associated with the water. Indeed, the administrative permit systems
that are nearly universal among the Western states require the relevant state agencies
to account for and protect these public values before granting private parties water
rights.118 Lasky lavished particular praise on the administrative system established
in Wyoming under the leadership of Elwood Mead. Lasky describes Mead as “one
far-sighted man”119 and quotes extensively from Mead’s seminal work: Irrigation
Institutions. One particular passage quoting Mead’s work merits repeating:
[N]ecessity has led to . . . a gradual decrease in the freedom of the
appropriator and an increase in control exercised by the public authorities.
This change has been so gradual that the legislatures have . . . in effect
abandoned the doctrine of prior appropriation, although retaining the word
in their statutes. The person using the water must secure a permit from a
board of the State officials, and . . . the right acquired is not governed by
the appropriator’s claim but by the license for diversion issued by the
authorities. The tendency toward . . . public supervision is manifest in the
other arid States and it seems only a question of time when the doctrine of
appropriation will give way to complete public supervision.120
The forward-thinking Lasky, and Elwood Mead before him, understood the
limitations of a pure form of prior appropriation. But their assumption that state
administrators or the courts would use the permit system to protect the public
interests in water has thus far proved illusory, at least in most Western states.
Nonetheless, opportunities to revive the long-dormant role of the public interest in
water administration remain. In particular, a decline in overall demand for water
resources121 could provide an opening for making more water available for public
117

Id. at 173.
While Colorado water rights are adjudicated in the State’s water courts, they have
adapted their system such that it works very much like a permit system, albeit with a bit more
formality. See TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 100, at 303–05.
119
Lasky, supra note 116, at 172.
120
Id. (quoting ELWOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 82 (1903)). Somewhat
ominously, Mead laments the tendency of government institutions to grant large speculative
water rights, noting that “[o]rganized selfishness is more potent than unorganized
consideration for the public interests.” ELWOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 87 (1903).
Ironically, while most states have proven adept at fighting off speculative claims, they have
proved far less capable of exercising their responsibility to consider and protect the public
interests. See, e.g., High Plains A & M v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710,
724 (Colo. 2005).
121
See Trends in Water Use in the United States, 1950–2015, U.S. GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY,
https://www.usgs.gov/special-topic/water-science-school/science/trends-wateruse-united-states-1950-2015?qt-science_center_objects=0#qt-science_center_objects
[https://perma.cc/Q74B-4CMP] (last visited Nov. 13, 2019).
118
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uses. On the other hand, cyclical drought,122 and climate change123 threaten to make
this a far more difficult challenge.
A. Appropriative Water Rights as Property
Like fish and wildlife,124 water is generally considered a public resource that,
in its natural state, cannot be privately owned.125 As previously noted, every Western
state, including the twelve states specifically described in this Article, expressly
declares in its statutes or constitution that the waters of the state are publicly
owned.126 Furthermore, each of these states preserves the public’s rights and may
have some duty to regulate the use of the state’s water for the benefit of the public.127
Before the states established modern regulatory programs to handle the
administration of water rights, priorities were established based upon the first
affirmative step to divert water and apply it to a beneficial use. Beginning with
Wyoming in 1890, however, all Western states now establish priority dates based
upon the date of the application to the state seeking to apply water to a beneficial
use;128 or, in the case of Colorado, to the date of the application to a water court for
a conditional right.129

122

See generally B. LYNN INGRAM & FRANCES MALAMUD-ROAM, THE WEST WITHOUT
WATER: WHAT PAST FLOODS, DROUGHTS, AND OTHER CLIMATIC CLUES TELL US ABOUT
TOMORROW (2013) (discussing the changing water situation in the Western United States).
123
National Climate Assessment: Water Supply, U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
RESEARCH PROGRAM (2014), https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/highlights/report-findings/
water-supply [https://perma.cc/6FTQ-NZL3].
124
See RASBAND ET AL., supra note 115, at 384–85.
125
See id. at 702.
126
ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.030 (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141(A) (2019);
CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 1; MONT.
CONST. art. IX, § 3(3); NEB. CONST. art. XIV, § 5; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.025 (2019);
N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; OR. REV. STAT. § 537.110 (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1
(West 2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.010 (2019); WYO. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
127
See Charles T. DuMars, Public Policy Considerations in State Water Allocations
and Management, 42 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. § 24.01, §§ 24.06–24.10 (1996); see also
ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080(a)(4) (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-153(A) (2019); CAL.
WATER CODE §§ 1253, 1255–1256 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE § 42-203A(5) (West 2019);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311(3)(b) (West 2019) (defining “reasonable use” by reference to
public interest criteria); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-234, 235(1), -235(2)(a)(iii), 235(4)(a)
(2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.370(5) (2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-7, 72-12-3(E)
(2019); West 2019); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 537.153(2), 537.170(8) (West 2019); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 73-3-8(1)(a)(iii), 8(1)(b)(i) (West 2019); WASH REV. CODE ANN. §
90.03.290(3) (West 2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-931–932, 41-3-503 (West 2019).
128
1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, §§ 11.04(b), 12.02(b).
129
Id. at § 15.05. Conditional water rights are defined in Colorado statutes. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-92-103(6) (2019).
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As previously noted, water rights must be used on the land for which they were
appropriated.130 The owner of a water right can, however, generally change the use,
place of use, or point of diversion without loss of priority, so long as the change will
not cause injury to other appropriators.131
The long history of Western states’ support for private use of the public’s water
resources has led many to believe that water rights are a kind of “super-property”
right that is not subject to regulation in the same manner as other property rights.132
Professor Joseph Sax has argued, however, that:
[This] view is wrong. . . . Water rights have no greater protection against
state regulation than any other property rights. . . . In fact, water rights
have less protection than most other property rights . . . because their
exercise may intrude on a public common.133
To illustrate the tradition of subordinating private water rights to the public
interest, Sax quotes Justice Holmes’s description of the fundamental principles
underlying state regulation of water rights:
[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable, and independent of
particular theory than the interest of the public of a state to maintain the
rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such
drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the
purpose of turning them to a more perfect use. This public interest is
omnipresent wherever there is a state, and grows more pressing as
population grows. . . . The private right to appropriate is subject . . . to the
initial limitation that it may not substantially diminish one of the great
foundations of public welfare and health.134
As Holmes recognized, the notion that private parties could gain absolute
control over water was untenable, given the vital role of this resource to the
wellbeing of the community.135
130

1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra, note 3, § 12.02(f).
However, to change the purpose of use, place of use, or point of diversion, the
appropriator is usually required to apply to the state for permission. Id. at § 14.01(a).
132
Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61
U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 260 (1990).
133
Id. In describing how water rights are subject to state regulation, Sax also notes that
they are limited by definition to beneficial, non-wasteful uses and that water rights can also
be limited by conditions articulated in the permit granting the right. Id.
134
Id. at 274–75 (quoting Hudson Cty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356
(1908)). Although Hudson Cty. Water Co. involved New Jersey’s riparian-based water laws,
Holmes makes clear that private water rights are subordinate to the public interest that exists
“wherever there is a state.” Id.
135
See Sax, supra note 132, at 276–77.
131
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Notwithstanding the clear public aspects of water resources, no one seriously
contests the ability of private water users to secure a vested right136 to use that
water.137 And while the precise nature of this “usufructuary” property right varies
from state to state,138 these rights cannot be viewed as sacrosanct. In particular, as
Professor Sax suggests, private water rights do not include the right to use waters in
derogation of public values. A compelling case can even be made that states are
required to limit the allocation of water as necessary to protect these public values,
and where states have failed to do so, such limits might fairly be implied on the basis
of clear statutory and constitutional language.
B. Acquiring a Water Right in the Western States
While an early miner needed only to post notice at the point of diversion and
apply the diverted water to a beneficial use to perfect a water right,139 all Western
states now have complex statutory schemes to regulate the allocation and
administration of water rights.140 In every state except Colorado, the authority over
water rights is vested in an administrative agency, often called a State Engineer,141
but sometimes a state board or other state agency.142 Appropriators in these states
136

Thus, the state or federal government cannot take water rights from an appropriator
without providing just compensation. For a discussion of the complex legal framework
applicable to takings cases, see 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 35.09.
137
The nature of the property right in water under prior appropriation is usufructuary,
in that a water rights holder does not own the water itself, but rather owns the right to put the
water to beneficial use. See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 4.01.
138
Generally, water in canals, conduits, reservoirs, and pipes is not considered personal
property, while water held in containers after delivery to consumers is treated as personal
property. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 86 (4th ed. 2009). Conversely,
some states treat all water in the possession of a beneficial user as personal property. Id.
139
See HUTCHINS, supra note 107, at 440. “Perfecting” a water right generally refers to
completing all the necessary steps for the state water agency to fully recognize the water
right, usually by issuing a license or permit. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, §
12.02(e).
140
1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 15.01.
141
In Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, the state engineer is charged with
administering the water permit system. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.110, 533.325 (West
2019); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-1; UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-2-1 (West 2019); WYO. CONST.
art. 8, § 2. Colorado also has a state engineer, but as that state employs a judicial system for
issuing water rights, the state engineer’s duties primarily relate to the administration and
distribution of existing water rights. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 (2019) et seq.
142
States that do not have a state engineer typically administer water through a
department of natural resources, headed by a “director” or “commissioner.” Alaska:
Department of Natural Resources. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.010 (2019). Arizona: Department
of Water Resources. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-103 (2019). California: State Water
Resources Control Board. CAL. WATER CODE § 174 (West 2019). Idaho: Department of
Water Resources. IDAHO CODE § 42-1775 (2019). Montana: Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-15-3301, 85-2-112 (2019). Nebraska:
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must obtain a permit from the relevant state entity before they can withdraw water.143
Colorado is unique in its use of a judicial system, but that system has evolved to
employ some of the efficiencies of an administrative agency.144 In particular, water
courts in Colorado have developed an application that is hard to distinguish from a
permit.145
The permitting process allows states to determine whether the statutory
standards for issuing a water right have been met. Wyoming’s law is typical. It
requires applicants to submit evidence showing a beneficial use, the availability of
unappropriated water, adequate diversion facilities, and that the proposed use will
not impair the value of existing rights.146 In every state discussed in this Article
except Colorado, the agency is also authorized or required to reject or condition
applications that are not consistent with the public interest or public welfare.147 Thus,
as the principal architect of the original water law provisions in the Wyoming
constitution and Wyoming statutes, Elwood Mead recognized that the permitting
process would be essential to protecting public values.148 In practice, however, an
application for a permit to appropriate water is generally approved if the applicant
follows the prescribed procedures and the agency finds that there is unappropriated
water available.149 Only rarely does the permitting agency actually take account of
Department of Natural Resources. NEB. REV. STAT. § 61-206 (2019). Oregon: Water
Resources Department. OR. REV. STAT. § 536.039 (2019). Washington: Department of
Ecology. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21A.064 (2019).
143
1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 15.01.
144
Although in Colorado water rights are judicially determined, the process beings with
an application form that is similar to other states’ permit applications. See COLO. JUD.
BRANCH,
APPLICATION
FOR
WATER
RIGHTS
(SURFACE)
(2017),
https://www.courts.state.co.us/Forms/PDF/JDF%20296W%20App%20for%20water%20ri
ghts%20(surface).pdf [https://perma.cc/BA6W-VSTB]. The Colorado system of water
courts is described infra Part X. See also TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 100, at 303–05.
145
Colorado uses an application for a conditional water right, which is equivalent to a
water permit application. COLO. JUD. BRANCH, APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS (SURFACE)
AND CERTIFICATE OF NOTICE (2013), https://www.courts.state.co.us/Forms/PDF/JDF%2029
0W%20Certificate%20of%20Notice%20R7-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CDH-B5V3].
146
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-501–503 (2019).
147
Grant, Public Interest Review supra note 28, at 683.
148
The permit application and adjudication process designed by Mead makes it the duty
of the State Engineer to reject an application that “threatens to prove detrimental to the public
interest.” WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-503 (2019). As Moses Lasky explained:
It was the fate of prior-appropriation . . . to lose ground to such administrative
systems almost from the beginning . . . . [But] the Wyoming system, so often
lauded over the Colorado, deserves the praise, not as a better administration, but
as evidence of a better substantive law of waters.
Lasky supra, note 116, at 171.
149
See Ronald B. Robie, The Public Interest in Water Rights Administration, 23 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 917, 935 (1977); Grant, Public Interest Review supra note 28, at 688.
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the impacts on public interest values.150 The typical process for obtaining a permit
is described below.
First, a prospective appropriator must formally apply to the state engineer or
appropriate agency for a permit to withdraw unappropriated water.151 Other affected
parties may protest or object to the application during a prescribed time period on
the grounds that it fails to meet the state’s statutory criteria for issuance of a
permit152—including, ostensibly, whether it is consistent with the public interest.153
If there are properly filed objections or protests, the agency may hold a public
hearing regarding the application.154 Based on a record compiled by an agency
official, the permit application will be approved, disapproved, or provisionally
approved with modifications or conditions.155 Judicial review of the agency’s
findings may then be available.
When an application is approved, a permit will be issued. A permit is not a
perfected water right, but it may become one once certain conditions are met.156 In
particular, the permittee must construct the diversion works, divert the water, and
apply the water to a beneficial use within a defined time period.157 In most states,
the responsible agency may impose additional conditions that might limit the
exercise of the water right.158 After the water has been applied to a beneficial use,
states generally require the permittee to seek an adjudication of the water right.159
This affords the state the opportunity to limit the water right to the actual uses and
needs of the appropriator, potentially allowing the state a second chance to consider
the impacts of the use on the public interest.160 Once the permit has been adjudicated,
the water right vests and the priority relates back to the time that the original permit
application was filed.161 The final step in the process is the issuance of a document,
150

See infra Part VIII.
See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 15.03(a).
152
Standing requirements vary by state. California, for example, has a liberal policy,
allowing “any interested party” to protest an application. CAL. WATER CODE § 1330 (2019).
New Mexico has stricter requirements, limiting standing to holders of water rights that may
be detrimentally affected by the granting of the application, or to objectors who claim that
granting the application will be contrary to the conservation of water or detrimental to the
public welfare and who will be “substantially and specifically affected” if the application is
granted. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-5(B) (2019) (emphasis added). See the individual state
summaries, infra, for the standing requirements of each state reviewed in this Article.
153
1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 15.03(b).
154
Id.
155
See A. DAN TARLOCK & JASON ANTHONY ROBISON, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND
RESOURCES § 5:51 (2019).
156
See, id.; see also AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, supra note 103 and accompanying
text defining a perfected water right.
157
See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 15.03(d)(1).
158
See TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 155, § 5:51.
159
See RASBAND ET AL., supra note 115, at 879.
160
See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-511 (2019).
161
See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 15.03(d)(1).
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alternatively called a “license,” “certificate,” “certificate of appropriation,” or
“water right certificate,” defining the water right holder’s property interest in
water.162
Water rights may also be transferred to another beneficial use or place of use,
or changes may be made at the point of diversion, subject to state law limitations.163
Appropriators seeking to make such changes must first file an application with the
same state authority that acted on their original permit application.164 Other
appropriators may object to the change application on the basis that it will injure
their rights, and in most states, the person seeking the new use has the burden of
proving that no harm will result.165 Most Western states also authorize or require
denial of a change application based on public interest grounds, just as they do in
initial applications to appropriate.166
While the preceding section focuses on the allocation of surface water, prior
appropriation concepts also govern groundwater use in most Western states.167
However, due in part to the hydrological complexities of groundwater and in part to
its nature as an important common-pool public resource, state groundwater laws in
Western states lack the consistency that is found with respect to surface water
allocation laws.168 A comprehensive discussion of the West’s varied and complex

162

See id. at § 15.03(d)(2).
Id. at § 14.01(a).
164
See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-104 (2019).
165
GETCHES, supra note 138, at 175. Once the applicant has made a prima facie case,
however, the burden shifts to the objector to prove harm. Id. at 176.
166
See, e.g., Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499–500 (Utah 1989).
167
Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming are among the states incorporating appropriation concepts in
their groundwater laws. GETCHES, supra note 138, at 273. While some of the same reasons
for affording rights to earlier appropriators of surface water also apply to groundwater, such
as encouraging investment and development, strict application of the doctrine is not practical.
For example, because virtually any new pumping will have some effect on existing wells, in
theory a senior groundwater appropriator could demand that no new pumping be allowed.
Strict application of the doctrine also frustrates individual equities and the public interest;
for example, it could deny rights to junior appropriators that own overlying land and have
no other available water source, and it ignores the nonrenewable nature of some groundwater
resources. Id. at 272–73.
168
For example, California’s groundwater law is generally based on the correlative
rights doctrine, providing overlying landowners with the right to a reasonable share of the
total supply of groundwater, but the rights to exported (surplus) groundwater are determined
by prior appropriation. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 21.03. In contrast,
Wyoming adheres pretty closely to a prior appropriation theory with some minor
modifications. Mark Squillace & Reed D. Benson, Wyoming, in 4 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, supra note 3, at I.C.2. Other states give broad rights to use as much water as they
can reasonably use on their overlying land. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-453;
(2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-702 (2019).
163
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groundwater management regimes is beyond the scope of this Article.169 Still, the
same public interest principles that constrain surface water allocations often
constrain groundwater allocations as well,170—though some groundwater rights
have historically been tied to ownership of the overlying land in ways that might
allow the groundwater user to avoid a public interest review altogether.171
VIII. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN WESTERN WATER LAW
The impetus for this Article came from the recognition of a tension in Western
water law: while most Western states require that decisions to allocate water
resources be carried out in a manner that protects the public interest, water allocation
practices often fail to protect even the most basic public values, as introduced above.
In fact, states frequently award water rights without ever considering the public
interest, even where the law appears to require it.172 This Part surveys the water
resources laws in twelve Western states in an effort to understand how they approach
the public interest. I do not intend this as a comprehensive review of the water laws
of these states. Moreover, the analysis laid out here is not limited to these states.
Rather, these states were chosen as illustrative of the problem and because they have
well-developed legal systems for, and substantial experience with, allocating water.
This Part, therefore, offers a window into how—and how well—states protect public
values in managing their water resources.
A near-universal consensus exists in modern societies, and in particular among
Western American states, that the public interest must be protected when allocating
and managing water resources.173 As presented below, to varying degrees, the
constitutions, statutes, and regulations adopted by Western American states
specifically invoke the public interest or some similar concept as a threshold
principle of their water law. With a few exceptions, however, actually defining the
public interest, and applying the concept to water rights and water management
decisions, has proved far more elusive. In particular, and as described below, only
two states—Washington and California—appear to address the public interest
routinely in the consideration of water rights applications, although a number of
other states have occasionally considered and even denied applications on public
interest grounds.
169

For a detailed overview of groundwater management in the western United States,
see JEFFERY S. ASHLEY & ZACHARY C. SMITH, GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT IN THE WEST
(1999).
170
See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-932(c) (West 2019).
171
See, e.g., Gregg Eckhardt, Laws and Regulations Applicable to the Edwards Aquifer,
THE
EDWARDS
AQUIFER
WEBSITE,
https://www.edwardsaquifer.net/rules.html
[https://perma.cc/8N6C-CWX2] (last visited Nov. 6, 2019).
172
See Grant, Public Interest Review, supra note 28, at 694, 702–08.
173
See generally Mitch Tobin, Conservation in the West Poll: Findings on Waterrelated Public Opinion, WATERPOLLS.ORG (July 12, 2018), https://waterpolls.org/conservat
ion-in-the-west-poll-2018/ [https://perma.cc/8TUR-YNB9].
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In Wyoming and Nebraska, the public interest in water use is rooted in those
states’ constitutions. For example, Article VIII, Section 3 of the Wyoming
Constitution provides that “[n]o appropriation [of water] shall be denied except
when such denial is demanded by the public interests.”174 Wyoming’s water law
reaffirms this requirement, providing that:
[I]t shall be the duty of the State Engineer to approve all applications . . .
which contemplate the application of water to a beneficial use and where
the proposed use does not tend to impair the value of existing rights, or be
otherwise detrimental to the public welfare. But where . . . the proposed
use . . . threatens to prove detrimental to the public interest, it shall be the
duty of the state engineer to reject such application . . . .175
Despite these clear legal requirements, neither the state legislature nor the
courts nor the State Engineer’s Office have ever defined the public interest, and the
State Engineer appears to ignore the requirement when it reviews and approves
water rights applications.176 Applications for permits to appropriate water are
reviewed for acceptability using a standardized checklist by the State Engineer’s
Office,177 but this checklist includes no filter for a public interest review. Perhaps it
should not be surprising then that the public interest has never served as a basis for
denying water permits in Wyoming.
During a boom in coal bed methane (CBM) development in northeastern
Wyoming during the early part of the twenty-first century, the State Engineer issued
thousands of water permits for CBM wells because the gas could not be removed
without first removing the groundwater that holds the gas in place.178 The cumulative
effect of these wells, and particularly the disposal of wastewater on the surface, was
allegedly harming ranchers in the Powder River Basin, where much of the CBM
development was occurring.179 This led to the only case where the public interest
was expressly raised in the context of Wyoming state water law.180 In William F.
West Ranch, LLC. v. Tyrrell,181 a group of Powder River Basin ranchers sued the
State Engineer for approving groundwater permits for CBM wells without
174

WYO. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (amended 2008).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-503 (2016). The State Engineer is designated under the
Wyoming Constitution as having “general supervision over the waters of the state.” WYO.
CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (amended 2008).
176
Interview with Pat Tyrell, State Engineer, State of Wyo., in Cheyenne, Wyo. (July
12, 2007).
177
Id. at 1.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 1 n.11.
180
See Big Horn Power Co. v. State, 148 P. 1110, 1115 (Wyo. 1915) (upholding a
decision to deny an application for a high dam on the Big Horn River because it would
inundate the only viable railroad right-of-way through the basin).
181
206 P.3d 722 (Wyo. 2009).
175
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considering the public interest.182 The plaintiffs complained specifically about water
pollution and flooding that was caused by water releases from CBM wells.183 The
Wyoming Supreme Court never reached the merits, however, dismissing the case on
the grounds that the case was not justiciable because the plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate that they had suffered or would suffer any direct harm as a result of the
State Engineer’s alleged failure to comply with the Wyoming Constitution and
enabling water statutes.184
An even better example of Wyoming’s unwillingness to credit its constitutional
public interest standard comes from the state’s water statutes. Wyoming law limits
water diversions for agricultural lands to one cubic foot per second for each seventy
acres of irrigated land.185 This is a generous but fairly common allocation of water
for agricultural purposes.186 In 1945 and 1985, however, Wyoming effectively
granted agricultural users a second cubic foot per second for each seventy acres of
irrigated land,187 which is far more than is generally needed to grow crops
efficiently.188 While in theory, Wyoming farmers are still limited by the beneficial
use requirement, the excessive appropriations authorized under the 1945 and 1985
laws obviously pose serious concerns about the protection of public interest values
in streams. To make matters even worse, however, Wyoming law provides that,
“where there may be in any stream water in excess of the total amount of all
appropriations from said stream, such excess shall be divided among the
appropriators therefrom in proportion to the acreage covered by their respective
permits . . . .”189 Thus, Wyoming water law appears to authorize appropriators to
divide up the waters of a stream until nothing is left. The dewatering of Wyoming’s
streams as expressly authorized under this law flies in the face of the State’s
182

Id. at 729.
Id. at 725.
184
Id. at 729. The Court was particularly concerned that the plaintiffs were requesting
“some type of general ruling” regarding the improper administration of CBM water “without
challenging a specific action or requesting individualized relief.” Id. at 734–35.
185
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-317 (West 2019).
186
See, e.g., Caleb Carter et al., Wyoming Small Acreage Irrigation, U. OF WYO. 3 (Dec.
2017), http://www.uwyo.edu/barnbackyard/_files/documents/resources/irrigation/wysmall
acreageirrigationguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/PN2H-6LCH] (“In Wyoming, a basic water
right for irrigation from a surface water source is 1 cubic foot per second (cfs) for 70 acres
of land.”).
187
The 1945 statute, known as the Surplus Water Law, gave pre-1945 agricultural
appropriators a second cfs. 1945 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 153, § 6 (codified as amended at WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 41-4-322). The 1985 statute known as the Excess Water Law gave post-1945
and pre-1985 agricultural appropriators a second cfs. 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 176, § 1
(codified as amended WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-330 (1985)).
188
Samantha Larson, How Much Water Does it Take to Grow America’s Favorite
Foods?, SMITHSONIAN (Apr. 10, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/howmuch-water-does-it-take-grow-americas-favorite-foods-180954941/ [https://perma.cc/4FE9
-8F3D].
189
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-317 (emphasis added).
183
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constitutional obligation to administer its water resources to protect the public
interests.
In an interview with the Pat Tyrell, the Wyoming State Engineer from 2001
through 2019, he acknowledged that the public interest is “poorly defined in our
statute,” and that permits are never rejected for public interest reasons.190 But he
added that the “public interest” is too amorphous to be considered at the permitting
stage.191 When asked about adopting rules to define the public interest, he indicated
that his office had not considered that option.192 He further acknowledged that the
current process grants water permits based only on the highest and best use of water
at the time the decision is made and does not take into account possible future
needs.193 In explaining this approach, the State Engineer claimed that he lacked the
ability to be “prescient to what better use may come along ten years down the
road.”194
Nebraska’s initial foray into water law came in the form of the 1895
Appropriation and Irrigation Law, which dedicated the use of waters within the State
to its citizens.195 Nebraska subsequently amended its constitution in 1920 by adding
a provision that tracks Wyoming’s language pretty closely, declaring that, “[t]he
right to divert unappropriated waters of every natural stream for beneficial use shall
never be denied except when such denial is demanded by the public interest.”196
While the State does not appear to consider the public interest routinely in
reviewing water rights application, it has nonetheless rejected several applications
on public interest grounds—and the Nebraska Supreme Court has approved of these
actions. For example, in Central Platte Natural Resources Dist. v. City of Fremont,
the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the State’s decision to deny a water diversion
application on the grounds that the proposed project would jeopardize the
endangered whooping crane and would thus be contrary to the public interest.197
Likewise, in an earlier case, the Director of Water Resources rejected the
applications of a water district seeking to make inter-basin water-diversion
190

Interview with Pat Tyrell, State Engineer, State of Wyo., in Cheyenne, Wyo. (July
12, 2007).
191
Of course, the statute specifically requires the State Engineer to reject an application
that “threatens to prove detrimental to the public interest.” WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-503.
Thus, whether amorphous or not, the State Engineer appears to be acting in violation of
Wyoming law.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
See Ralph J. Fischer, Richard S. Harnsberger & Jarret C. Oeltjen, Rights to Nebraska
Streamflows: A Historical Overview with Recommendations, 52 NEB. L. REV. 313, 348
(1973) (citing NEB. LAWS c. 69 1895).
196
NEB. CONST. art. XIV, § 6; see also KATE GAUL & LOGAN SEACREST, NEB.
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH OFFICE, THE NEBRASKA CONSTITUTION: 1866–2016, at 159 (2017),
http://nebraskalegislature.gov/pdf/reports/research/constitution2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6V9E-9K25].
197
Cent. Platte Nat. Res. Dist. v. Fremont, 549 N.W.2d 112, 121 (Neb. 1996).
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applications because these diversions could harm various endangered species.198
Once again, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the decision on public interest
grounds.199 In yet another case, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld an instream
flow appropriation made pursuant to statute and specifically rejected a constitutional
challenge to the law, finding that “the public interest demands the recognition of
instream uses for fish, recreation, and wildlife.”200
Most other Western states recognize the public interest by statute rather than
under their constitutions, and their approaches to protecting the public interest vary
widely. Washington and California are particularly noteworthy, as they are the only
states that appear to embed a public interest review into the water permit application
process.201
Washington law authorizes:
[t]he department of ecology [to] establish minimum water flows or levels
for streams, lakes or other public waters for the purposes of protecting fish,
game, birds or other wildlife resources, or recreational or aesthetic values
of said public waters whenever it appears to be in the public interest to
establish the same.202
But this somewhat equivocal language is followed with a specific mandate:
“[p]erennial rivers and streams of the state shall be retained with base flows
necessary to provide for preservation of wildlife, fish, scenic, aesthetic and other
environmental values, and navigational values.”203 A limited exception allows for
198

In re Applications A-16027, 495 N.W.2d 23, 35 (Neb. 1993).
Id. at 34. The Nebraska statute lays out specific factors that must be considered in
determining whether an interbasin transfer is in the public interest. These include:
199

(1) The economic, environmental, and other benefits of the proposed interbasin
transfer and use; (2) Any adverse impacts of the proposed interbasin transfer and
use; (3) Any current beneficial uses being made of the unappropriated water in
the basin of origin; (4) Any reasonably foreseeable future beneficial uses of the
water in the basin of origin; (5) The economic, environmental, and other benefits
of leaving the water in the basin of origin for current or future beneficial uses; (6)
Alternative sources of water supply available to the applicant; and (7) Alternative
sources of water available to the basin of origin for future beneficial uses.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-289 (2000). The statute then goes on to note that “[t]he application
shall be deemed in the public interest if the overall benefits to the state and the applicant’s
basin are greater than or equal to the adverse impacts to the state and the basin of origin.” Id.
200
In re Application A-16642, 463 N.W.2d 591, 605 (Neb. 1990); see NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 46-2,107 (1984).
201
See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.22.010 (2019); CAL. WATER CODE § 1253 (West 2019).
202
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.22.010.
203
Id. § 90.54.020(3)(a). The statute also requires that waters of the state “be of high
quality.” Id. § 90.54.020(3)(b).
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the withdrawal of water that would reduce these base flows “only in those situations
where it is clear that overriding considerations of the public interest will be
served.”204 The Washington Supreme Court has made clear that this exception “is
very narrow . . . and requires extraordinary circumstances before the minimum flow
water right can be impaired.”205
In the context of issuing permits to appropriate water, a Washington statute
describes four criteria that must be met before a permit to appropriate may be
granted.206 The third criterion is that the proposed water use cannot “threaten to
prove detrimental to the public welfare.”207 To implement this requirement, the
Washington Administrative Code requires “the department of ecology [to] conduct
a reconnaissance survey for the purpose of determining whether or not the interests
of the public can best be served by the adjudication of the individual rights [to use
waters of a stream or other source].”208 The Washington Supreme Court has also
made clear that the State has a responsibility to consider water quality in making a
decision on a water rights application due to the State’s Environmental Policy Act.209
Despite the strong support for public interest review in Washington, the
Washington Supreme Court refused to allow the Department of Ecology to consider
the public interest in the context of a change in the point of diversion of an existing
water right on the grounds that the relevant statute authorized such changes if they
could be carried out without detriment or injury to existing rights, and where the
water had been put to beneficial use.210 Although a change in the point of diversion
may seem like a relatively minor action, the court’s decision appears to apply to any
change application, since the statute construed by the court addressed transfers
broadly.211 On the other hand, the court made clear that the Department retained the

204

Id. While the “public interest” is not defined here, the statute suggests that the public
values in the state’s water resources are given paramount importance.
205
Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 311 P.3d 6, 8 (Wash. 2013);
Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 11 P.3d 726, 735 (Wash. 2000).
206
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.290. The four criteria are (1) determining “what water, if
any, is available for appropriation”; (2) “find[ing] and determin[ing] to what beneficial use
or uses it can be applied”; (3) “find[ing] whether the proposed development is likely to prove
detrimental to the public interest”; and (4) finding that “the application will not impair
existing rights.” Id. §§ 90.03.290(1), (3).
207
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.290(3).
208
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 508-12-080 (2019).
209
Stempel v. Dep’t of Water Res., 508 P.2d 166, 171 (Wash. 1973); see WASH. REV.
CODE § 43.21C.010–.914.
210
Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille Cty. v. Dept. of Ecology, 51 P.3d 744, 746
(Wash. 2002). The Utah Supreme Court reached a different conclusion on similar facts, but
the relevant statute there provided that the “rights and duties of the applicants with respect
to applications for permanent changes of point of diversion, place or purpose of use shall be
the same as provided in this title for applications . . . .” Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497,
499 (Utah 1989) (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3 (1980)).
211
See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.380.
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authority to condition the existing water right on the maintenance of minimum
stream flows.212
Treatment of the public’s interest in California operates somewhat like
Washington. Section 1253 of the California State Water Code provides that the State
Water Resources Control Board (Board) “shall allow the appropriation for beneficial
purposes of unappropriated water under such terms and conditions as in its judgment
will best develop, conserve, and utilize in the public interest the water sought to be
appropriated.”213 In People v. Shirokow, the California Supreme Court upheld the
Board’s decision to issue an appropriation permit subject to the condition that the
applicant institute a brush removal program to salvage the amount of water needed,
finding that the Board properly acted to protect the public interest.214 More
specifically, the court held that “[i]f the board determines a particular use is not in
furtherance of the greatest public benefit, on balance the public interest must
prevail.”215
Like Washington, California also provides for instream flow protection up
front, when decisions are made to allocate water. The Director of the California
Department of Fish and Game (Fish and Game) must identify and list streams and
watercourses throughout the state where minimum flow levels need to be established
in order to assure the “continued viability of stream-related fish and wildlife
resources.” The Director must provide that list to the Board, and the Board may deny
an appropriation permit that infringes on streamflow requirements identified by Fish
and Game.216
The California process seems somewhat less robust than the Washington
approach since, unlike Washington,217 California does not require protection of
scenic, aesthetic, environmental, and navigational values. Moreover, the Board
retains discretion to refuse to protect streamflows identified by Fish and Game—
although technically the failure to protect those flows could be deemed arbitrary and
capricious by a court.218 Nonetheless, protecting minimum instream flows for fish
and wildlife will likely provide substantial protection for those other public values

212
Pub. Util. District No. 1, 51 P.3d at 765–66. (holding that appellee had “authority to
impose instream flow conditions in a state water quality certification under § 401 of the
Clean Water Act regardless of whether the applicant for the federal license [had] existing
water rights.”).
213
CAL. WATER CODE § 1253 (West 2019) (emphasis added).
214
605 P.2d 859, 866 (Cal. 1980).
215
Id.; see also CAL. WATER CODE § 1253; id. § 1255 (“The board shall reject an
application when in its judgment the proposed appropriation would not best conserve the
public interest.”).
216
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 10001–10002 (West 2019); see also CAL. FISH AND GAME
CODE § 1600 (West 2019) (“[T]he protection and conservation of fish and wildlife resources
are of utmost public interest.”).
217
See supra notes 197–198 and accompanying text.
218
See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11350 (West 2019).
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that are specifically noted in Washington’s law, such as recreational, scenic, and
aesthetic values.
One additional aspect of California law warrants discussion. As previously
noted, the public interest is best understood as distinct from the common law public
trust doctrine. But the impact of the California Supreme Court’s decision in National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court219 (the Mono Lake case) for protecting the public
interest cannot be ignored. Even though the decision arguably conflates the public
trust doctrine with the public interest by expanding the former doctrine beyond its
historical roots, recognizing a trust responsibility for protecting the state’s water
resources is not so different from protecting the public interests in those resources.
Moreover, the near-universal claim of state ownership of water resources for the
benefit of California residents, like other Western states, strongly implies a trust
responsibility. Still, as previously described in Part V, the common law roots of the
public trust doctrine are distinct from a statutory public interest requirement,220 and
the public trust doctrine might be more difficult for courts to construe flexibly.
The state closest to Washington and California in carrying out systematic public
interest reviews of water rights applications may be Oregon, which manages its
water resources through its Water Resources Department (OWRD), subject to
policies and rules established by the state Water Resources Commission (OWRC).221
At first blush, Oregon law appears somewhat narrow, as it establishes a rebuttable
presumption that a proposed water use “will not impair or be detrimental to the
public interest,” so long as an application meets basic criteria regarding the proposed
water use that are generally unrelated to public values.222 Moreover, the presumption
can only be rebutted if a protest is filed and sufficient evidence is presented at a
hearing to rebut the presumption.223 Applications, however, are subject to OWRC
rules,224 and those rules appear to require an affirmative public interest review by
the state agency, including consideration of any comments or protests received.225
This conclusion is supported by the water rights application form used in
Oregon.226 That form requires specific information about potential impacts on
sensitive, threatened, or endangered species, and a determination by the OWRD that

219

658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
That is not to say that the public trust doctrine is unrelated to the public interest or
that it could not be used to protect the public interest in water. It does mean, however, that
the public trust doctrine suffers from a narrow historical pedigree that could limit its
application in the context of water allocation and water management decisions.
221
OR. REV. STAT. § 537.153(2) (2017).
222
Id.
223
Id. at § 537.170.
224
Id. at § 537.153(2).
225
OR. ADMIN. R. §690-310-0110 (2019).
226
See OREGON WATER RESOURCES DEP’T, SURFACE WATER RIGHTS APPLICATION
FORM (2018), https://www.oregon.gov/owrd/WRDFormsPDF/surface_water_app.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EP6E-XD3C].
220
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the proposed use will not prove detrimental to the public interest in such species.227
The application form also takes account of various water quality concerns as well as
potential impacts from diversions that occur in the Columbia River basin.228
The Oregon Supreme Court has further reinforced this more expansive view of
the public interest inquiry. In Diack v. City of Portland, the court addressed a
diversion by the City of Portland that would draw water from a scenic waterway.229
The Diack court held that public interest criteria in the Oregon statute were “inexact
terms” that the state must interpret “in a way that effectuates the underlying statutory
policy.”230 To that end, the court held that a mere “regurgitation of the statutory
language, without analysis” is insufficient to meet requirements for a public interest
assessment.231 The clear implication of Diack is that the state has an affirmative
obligation to make specific findings demonstrating how it will protect the public
interest when it approves a water rights application.232 The current application form
used by the state seems designed to facilitate this obligation.
In a few states, the public interest has actually been defined by statute. For
example, Alaska’s water statute describing the criteria for issuing a permit expressly
provides:
(b) In determining the public interest, the commissioner shall consider
(1) the benefit to the applicant resulting from the proposed appropriation;
(2) the effect of the economic activity resulting from the proposed
appropriation;
(3) the effect on fish and game resources and on public recreational
opportunities;
(4) the effect on public health;
(5) the effect of loss of alternate uses of water that might be made within
a reasonable time if not precluded or hindered by the proposed
appropriation;
(6) harm to other persons resulting from the proposed appropriation;
(7) the intent and ability of the applicant to complete the appropriation;
and
(8) the effect upon access to navigable or public water.233
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Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 3.
229
759 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Or. 1988).
230
Id. at 1078.
231
Id.
232
More specifically, the court held that “the Commission should explain more fully its
application of the public interest criteria, pointing to the facts that it believes (if it still does)
permit it to make the “ultimate” findings and the conclusions it draws from them.” Id.
233
ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (2019).
228
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The Alaska Supreme Court employed this definition and related standards
implementing it in Tulkisarmute Native Community v. Heinze.234 In Tulkisarmute,
the court held that the Alaska Department of Natural Resources acted outside its
authority when it granted water rights permits to a mining group in derogation of
concerns raised by the Tulkisarmute Native Community Council (TNCC) regarding
the protection of fish and wildlife resources deemed vital to the livelihood of the
native community.235 The court held that the Commissioner should have conditioned
the permit to protect the public interest and the rights of the TNCC as required by
state law.236 The court emphasized that the Department of Natural Resources (DNR)
“may not issue a permit unless doing so is in the public interest,” and added that
“[i]n making this determination, DNR shall consider the impacts of water
appropriation on fish and game resources, public health, and access to navigable
water.”237 More than anything, this case illustrates the power of simply defining the
public interest by statute. While the Alaska definition accords the Alaska DNR wide
discretion, it necessarily encompasses public values such as the protection of fish
and game and public recreation, and the Alaska Supreme Court effectively required
that these public values be protected first and not merely balanced against private
economic interests.
Like Alaska, Idaho also defines the public interest but in its own unique way.
The Idaho Code authorizes the Director of the Department of Water Resources to
reject, condition, or limit a water rights application if it finds:
(a) that it will reduce the quantity of water under existing water rights;
(b) that the water supply itself is insufficient for the purpose for which it
is sought to be appropriated;
(c) where it appears to the satisfaction of the director that such application
is not made in good faith, is made for delay or speculative purposes;
(d) that the applicant has not sufficient financial resources with which to
complete the work involved therein;
(e) that it will conflict with the local public interest as defined in section
42-202B, Idaho Code;
(f) that it is contrary to conservation of water resources within the state of
Idaho;
234

Tulkisarmute Native Community Council v. Heinze, 898 P.2d 935 (Alaska 1995).
Id. at 938, 942.
236
Id. at 950; see also ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11 § 93.120(e) (2019) (“(e) [t]he
department may issue a permit subject to conditions considered necessary to protect the
rights of prior appropriators of record and the public interest, including: . . . (3) conditions to
maintain, or restrictions from withdrawing, a specific quantity, rate of flow or volume of
water at a given point on a stream or body of water, or in a specified reach of stream,
throughout the year or for specified times of the year, to achieve any of the following
purposes: (A) protection of fish or wildlife habitat; (B) recreational purposes; (C) navigation
. . . .”).
237
Heinze, 898 P.2d at 950 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080).
235
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(g) that it will adversely affect the local economy of the watershed or local
area within which the source of water for the proposed use originates.238
Section 42-202B defines the phrase “local public interest” as “the interests that
the people in the area directly affected by a proposed water use have in the effects
of such use on the public water resource.”239
Section 42-203A also contains a proviso that prohibits establishing minimum
stream flows under the local public interest standard, making clear that instream
flow protections are authorized only under Idaho’s separate instream flow law.240
This would appear to undercut the State’s ability to protect ecological and amenity
values in water bodies in the course of approving water rights applications, as is
done in Washington and California. In Shokal v. Dunn, however, the Idaho Supreme
Court construed the phrase “local public interest” broadly, to encompass a wide
range of more traditional public interest values such as fish and wildlife habitat,
aquatic life, recreation, and water quality.241 The court based its decision on the
explanation of the public interest contained in the instream flow law that had been
enacted on the same day.242 At the time of the Shokal decision, however, the Idaho
statute that requires consideration of the local public interest did not preclude the
use of the provision to protect instream flows. That language was added to the statute
in 2003.243 It thus remains an open question whether the Court will adhere to the
Shokal standard if the issue arises again in another case.
Like most Western states, Nevada law specifically requires the State Engineer
to reject a water rights application that “threatens to prove detrimental to the public
interest. . . .”244 In contrast to the Idaho Supreme Court, the Nevada Supreme Court
has accepted a much narrower definition of the public interest as that term was used
in the Nevada water rights application statute. In Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v.
Washoe County, the Nevada State Engineer argued that thirteen requirements from
the state’s existing water statutes provided sufficient direction for approving
applications in the public interest.245 These requirements, however, had little to do
with the public values associated with water, but instead focused on such matters as
238

IDAHO CODE § 42-203A(5) (2019).
Id. § 42-202B(3).
240
See IDAHO CODE § 42-203A(5) (2020) (“Provided however, that minimum stream
flow water rights may not be established under the local public interest criterion, and may
only be established pursuant to chapter 15, title 42, Idaho Code.”); see also IDAHO CODE §§
42-1501–1505 (2019) (for the Water Resource Board); see also Minimum Stream Flows,
IDAHO WATER RESOURCES BOARD, https://idwr.idaho.gov/IWRB/water-planning/minimum
-stream-flows/ [https://perma.cc/CNT9-UXFK] (last visited Aug. 15, 2018) (providing
public information on the Idaho’s Minimum Stream Flow program).
241
707 P.2d 441, 448–50 (Idaho 1985).
242
Id. at 448–49 (citing IDAHO CODE § 42-1501).
243
H.B. 284, 57 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2003)
244
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.370(2) (West 2019).
245
918 P.2d 697, 698–700 (Nev. 1996).
239
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whether the applicant had the financial capacity to complete the proposed project
and whether the water would be put to a beneficial use.246 The court specifically
rejected a broader interpretation of the public interest, such as the standard adopted
by the Idaho Supreme Court in Shokal.247
Given that the Nevada State Engineer identified the thirteen “public interest”
requirements only after he was sued, it seems fair to assume that the State does not
routinely and affirmatively address the public interest in approving water rights
applications, even under the narrow definition it put forth in Pyramid Lake. But
change may be coming to Nevada. In Mineral County v. State Department of
Conservation, the Nevada Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus seeking to
force the State of Nevada to better regulate water rights in the Walker River Basin.248
The court’s decision was based primarily on the fact that the Walker River Basin
was an interstate resource shared with California that had long been subject to the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.249 In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Rose
signaled a new willingness on the part of some members of the court to review the
nature and scope of public interest claims:
If the current law governing the water engineer does not clearly direct the
engineer to continuously consider in the course of his work the public’s
interest in Nevada’s natural water resources, then the law is deficient. It is
then appropriate, if not our constitutional duty, to expressly reaffirm the
engineer’s continuing responsibility as a public trustee to allocate and
supervise water rights so that the appropriations do not “substantially
impair the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.” “[T]he
public trust is more than an affirmation of state power to use public
property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to
protect the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands, and
tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the
abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust.” Our
dwindling natural resources deserve no less.250
Echoing the Mono Lake decision, Justice Rose made clear that the owners of
vested water rights hold these rights “forever subject to the public trust, which at all
times ‘forms the outer boundaries of permissible government action with respect to
public trust resources.’ In this manner, then, the public trust doctrine operates
simultaneously with the system of prior appropriation.”251
246

According to the court, the Nevada State Engineer “identified [thirteen] policy
considerations contained in Nevada water statutes . . . .” Id. at 698–99. These appear to have
been derived largely from NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.370 (West 2019).
247
Pyramid Lake, 918 P.2d at 700; c.f. Shokal, 707 P.2d at 450.
248
20 P.3d 800, 801 (Nev. 2001).
249
Id. at 807.
250
Id. at 808–09 (Rose, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
251
Id. at 808 (internal citations omitted).
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While Justice Rose freely mixes references to the public interest and the public
trust doctrine, his approach would take Nevada well beyond the Pyramid Lake
decision. Not only does it signal a new focus on the public values associated with
water, but it would also impose an affirmative duty on the Nevada State Engineer to
protect these values.
Justice Rose’s opinion remains particularly relevant today because, ten years
thereafter, in Lawrence v. Clark County,252 the Nevada Supreme Court quoted
extensively and approvingly from the Mineral County concurring opinion of Justice
Rose in the course of expressly adopting the public trust doctrine for Nevada.253
Although Lawrence arose in the context of the state’s ownership of the bed of a
navigable waterway—a traditional public trust resource—the Court appeared to
signal its readiness to move beyond Pyramid Lake and to adopt the more robust
approach to the public interest in water resource allocation advocated by Justice
Rose.254 The issue will likely be resolved soon, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has certified to the Nevada Supreme Court the question of whether the
public trust doctrine applies to already-adjudicated water rights in the state.255
Much like Nevada, Utah law requires the Utah State Engineer to approve an
application to appropriate water only if the “proposed plan . . . would not prove
detrimental to the public welfare.”256 The statute does not define the phrase
“detrimental to the public welfare,” and while the Utah courts have occasionally
been asked to consider the issue, the State does not appear to have any practice or
procedure for routinely reviewing water rights applications to address public welfare
concerns. For example, unlike Oregon, Utah’s water rights application forms do not
mention the public interest, public welfare, or public values,257 and the State has no
clear practice of conditioning permits to protect the public values associated with
Utah’s water resources. Nonetheless, the Utah Supreme Court has used the public
welfare standard in at least one case—not directly to protect public values, but rather
to give a preference to a later water rights application over an earlier application.258
252

254 P.3d 606 (Nev. 2011).
Id. at 610–13.
254
Id. at 611, n.1.
255
Mineral Cty. v. Walker River Irrigation District, 900 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2018)
(certifying to the Nevada Supreme Court questions of whether Nevada public trust doctrine
applies to adjudicated water rights and, if so, to what extent), docketed sub nom., Mineral
Cty. v. Lyon Cty., No. 75917 (Nev. argued Mar. 3, 2020).
256
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8(1)(a)(iii)(B) (West 2019).
257
See Applications & Forms, UTAH DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS,
https://www.waterrights.utah.gov/wrinfo/forms/ [https://perma.cc/4Z3B-FNJ9] (last visited
Aug. 15, 2018).
258
“Where the approval of the application would . . . interfere with the more beneficial
use for any of the purposes mentioned, or would prove detrimental to the public welfare, the
State Engineer is directed to reject the same.” Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957, 962 (Utah
1943). To be sure, the broad purposes of the Deer Creek Project proposed by the second
applicant, which included “domestic, culinary and irrigation purposes,” id. at 961, might
arguably encompass some public values.
253
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In Tanner v. Bacon, the court found that the express language of the Utah statute
requiring that the State Engineer reject an application where an appropriation is
detrimental to the public welfare, coupled with case law from surrounding states
with similar statutes, demonstrated that the State Engineer was authorized to reject
the earlier application “in the interest of the public welfare.”259
The scope of “public welfare” review also arose in Bonham v. Morgan, where
the Utah Supreme Court held that the standards that apply to the review of an original
water rights application also apply to a permanent water transfer application,
including the requirement that applications be rejected if detrimental to the public
welfare. 260 This set the stage for a 2016 case where the Utah Court of Appeals upheld
a change application following a public welfare review.261 In HEAL Utah v. Kane
County Water Conservancy District, the plaintiffs claimed that the applicants, who
were seeking to change their point of diversion and nature of use, had the burden of
showing that the statutory criteria for approving water rights, including the public
welfare standard, were met.262 While the court ultimately concluded that the
applicants had met their burden by showing that the proposed change would not
prove detrimental to the public welfare, it recognized the importance of addressing
the potential harm to public values, including public recreation and the natural
stream environment.263
New Mexico’s approach to the public interest seems to have followed a pattern
similar to that of Utah. Much like Utah, New Mexico law requires the New Mexico
State Engineer to approve an application “if the proposed appropriation is not
contrary to the conservation of water within the state and is not detrimental to the
public welfare of the state.”264 In Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, the New Mexico
259

Id. at 964.
788 P.2d 497, 498 (Utah 1989).
261
HEAL Utah v. Kane Cty. Water Conservancy Dist., 2016 UT App 153, 378 P.3d
1246 (2016).
262
Id. at ¶¶ 20, 21.
263
The Court of Appeals noted that the lower court had found that “99% of the time the
width of the river will be reduced less than 1.5 feet, out of an average width of approximately
350 feet,” and “99% of the time the depth of the river would be reduced less than 1.5 inches.”
Id. at ¶ 32. Further, although the “stretch of the Green and Colorado Rivers from Flaming
Gorge Reservoir to Lake Powell includes critical habitat for four species of endangered fish
unique to the Colorado River system, HEAL Utah’s evidence and experts were unable to
demonstrate the extent of impact the diversions would have on the fish or stream.” Id. at ¶¶
28–36 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court relied, in part, on an earlier decision of
the Utah Supreme Court in Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co., which had held that “the
applicant bears the burden of persuasion throughout the application process,” although the
court described this as “a fairly low burden.” 2006 UT 16, ¶¶ 35–42, 133 P.3d 382.
264
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-6 (LexisNexis 2019). Similar language applies to
applications for changes of place of use, id. at § 72-5-23, and groundwater. Id. § 72-12-3(E).
Separately, New Mexico requires the State Engineer to reject applications that are contrary
to the public welfare. Id. § 72-5-7. New Mexico law even affords “standing for those
asserting legitimate concerns involving public welfare and conservation of water” so long as
260
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Supreme Court reviewed a decision of the State’s Board of Water Commissioners
overturning a decision of the Territorial Engineer (the predecessor to the State
Engineer before New Mexico became a state) involving two conflicting
applications.265 The Territorial Engineer chose to approve the application later in
time on public interest grounds because it was “more within the available water
supply” and because of the lower cost of irrigation per acre. 266 The Commissioners
had determined that the public interest should be narrowly construed to allow denial
of an application only if it would be a “menace to the public health and safety.”267
The New Mexico Supreme Court disagreed, suggesting that the Territorial Engineer
had properly considered the economic viability of the competing projects.268
The application of the public welfare standard to water transfers also arose in
New Mexico, much as it had in Utah, although in a more interesting context. In re
Application of Sleeper involved a proposal to transfer water from traditional
irrigation purposes to a recreational lake associated with a ski area.269 The district
court judge denied the transfer on public interest grounds, having been persuaded
that “to transfer water rights, devoted for more than a century to agricultural
purposes, in order to construct a playground for those who can pay is a poor trade,
indeed.”270 On appeal, however, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the
provision requiring public interest review of water rights applications did not apply
to transfer applications.271 That ruling was later changed by statute such that
transfers are now subject to public interest reviews, just as in Utah.272
New Mexico’s limited foray into implementing the public welfare mandate in
its water resources law has not led to any clear policy regarding its scope, and the
State does not seem to apply the standard routinely in reviewing all water resources
applications.273 What does seem clear, however, is that New Mexico has faced
they do not impose undue burdens on the administrative and judicial processes. Id. § 72-55.1.
265
110 P. 1045 (N.M. 1910).
266
Id. at 1048, 1050.
267
Id. at 1048.
268
Id. at 1050. The court ultimately remanded the case to the lower court for further
fact-finding. Id. at 1051.
269
JOSE A. RIVERA, ACEQUIA CULTURE: WATERS, LANDS, AND COMMUNITY IN THE
SOUTHWEST 174 (1998) (citing In re Howard Sleeper et al., Rio Arriba County Cause No.
RA 84-53(C) (N.M. Div. 5, First Judicial Dist. April 16, 1985)).
270
Id. at 173.
271
In re Application of Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787, 790–92 (N.M. App. 1988).
272
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-23 (LexisNexis 2019).
273
See Consuelo Bokum, Implementing the Public Welfare Requirement in New
Mexico’s Water Code, 36 NAT. RES. J. 681, 690 (1996). Bokum suggests four options
available to the State for addressing the “public welfare” mandate: (1) interpreting public
welfare sufficiently narrowly that the issue is essentially avoided; (2) doing nothing
affirmatively to define public welfare and rule on the issue in an ad hoc manner; (3) relying
solely on the definitions that evolve from the regional and state water planning process to
produce definitions of public welfare; or (4) promulgating regulations defining public
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serious problems with stream dewatering, including the drying up of sections of the
mighty Rio Grande River itself.274
As with the laws of most other Western states, Arizona statutes require a water
rights application to be rejected if it is “against the interests and welfare of the
public.”275 There are, however, no reported cases from Arizona concerning the
application of this standard to water rights applications. Given the significant stream
dewatering that has occurred in Arizona,276 it does not appear that Arizona has
implemented this standard as might be necessary to protect public values in the
state’s water resources.
Montana is somewhat unique among Western states in not specifically
providing for a public interest review of water rights applications. Nonetheless,
Montana law requires the State Department of Natural Resources and Conservation
(DNRC) to consider certain public values, particularly in the context of large
diversions. In cases involving more than 5.5 cubic feet per second or greater than
4,000 acre-feet of water, the DNRC must determine whether a use is “reasonable.”277
An application will only be approved as a reasonable use if it considers the effects
on the quantity and quality of water, if it weighs the probable significant adverse
environmental impacts of the appropriation, and if it protects (among other things)
minimum streamflows for aquatic life.278 The adverse impact requirement highlights
the important role played by the Montana Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) in
the DNRC’s review of water permit applications. MEPA requires that state agencies
take public comment and prepare environmental assessments or environmental
impact statements on proposed agency actions before reaching a final decision.279
welfare broadly and establishing standards for applying the public welfare criterion. Id. at
691.
274
See Henry Fountain, In a Warming West, the Rio Grande Is Drying Up, N.Y. TIMES
(May 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/24/climate/dry-rio-grande.
html [https://perma.cc/ATB3-4Q5Y].
275
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-153.A (2019).
276
The conservation group, American Rivers reports that “[o]nce navigable by large
riverboats from its mouth nearly to Phoenix, the Gila below Phoenix today crosses the Gila
River Indian Reservation as an intermittent trickle due to large irrigation diversions.” Gila
River,
AMERICAN
RIVERS,
https://www.americanrivers.org/river/gila-river/
[https://perma.cc/6FZ6-ARTN] (last visited Aug. 16, 2018). The Salt River, which is a
significant tributary of the Gila that also flows through Phoenix, has generally run dry below
the Granite Reef Diversion Dam, since the dam was completed in 1908. The reservoir behind
the dam stores water for irrigation and municipal purposes. See Celebrating Arizona’s
Rivers, ENVTL. DEF. FUND (Apr. 2012), http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDFSalt_River.pdf [https://perma.cc/9264-GQS9].
277
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311(3) (2019).
278
Id.
279
MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-102(1) (2019). See generally HOPE STOCKWELL, MONT.
ENVTL. QUALITY COUNCIL, A GUIDE TO THE MONTANA ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
(2013), https://www.leg.mt.gov/content/Publications/Environmental/2013-mepa-handbook
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CAB-982B] (providing guidance on when MEPA applies and the
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The final Western state considered in this Article is Colorado. Colorado appears
last in this survey largely because it is the only state that has expressly disavowed
an obligation to consider the public interest in the allocation of water resources. This
is surprising not least because Colorado’s constitution contains strong language that
appears to recognize the importance of public values in the state’s water resources:
The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the
state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, and
the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to
appropriation as hereinafter provided.280
The last phrase, of course, seems to limit the preceding language, and the very
next section of the State constitution provides that “[t]he right to divert the
unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be
denied.”281 To be sure, this language could be construed to allow the State to decide
that waters are not “unappropriated” if they are necessary to protect the people’s use
of the water, as guaranteed by the State constitution. But that is not the conclusion
reached by the Colorado Supreme Court. In Board of County Commissioners of the
County of Arapahoe v. United States, the Colorado Supreme Court held that
“[c]onceptually, a public interest theory is in conflict with the doctrine of prior
appropriation because a water court cannot, in the absence of statutory authority,
deny a legitimate appropriation based on public policy.”282 The Colorado Supreme
Court thus left open the possibility that the State legislature might someday require
public interest review of water resource decisions,283 but no effort has been made to
establish such a requirement in the more than twenty years since the court rendered
its decision.284

appropriate steps for agencies to take).
280
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
281
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6. This presents an interesting contrast with the Wyoming
constitution, which contains the same language but adds the qualifying phrase “except as
demanded by the public interests.” WYO. CONST. art VIII, §3; see supra note 119, at 172 and
accompanying text.
282
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. United States (In re Application for Water Rights of the Bd.
of Cty. Comm’rs), 891 P.2d 952, 972 (Colo. 1995).
283
As the court noted, “[t]he degree of protection afforded the environment and the
mechanism to address state appropriation of water for the good of the public is the province
of the General Assembly and the electorate.” Id. at 974. The court also rejected the claim
that “beneficial use” limitation on water rights should be construed to encompass a “broad
public policy of protecting the . . . environment,” and suggested that the state’s instream flow
law was how the legislature intended to protect the environment. Id. at 971–72.
284
The Colorado Court of Appeals has, however, recognized the authority of counties
to regulate domestic water system development to ensure that such systems do not
significantly deteriorate aquatic habitats and wetlands. City of Colo. Springs v. Bd. of Cty.
Comm’rs of County of Eagle, 895 P.2d 1105, 1111–12 (Colo. App. 1994).
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IX. RESTORING THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
A universal principle of water law—not just Western-style, prior appropriation
law, but virtually all water law—is public ownership of the resource.285 If we accept
this as true, then how is it even possible that state agencies charged with managing
this public resource are allowed to make decisions that operate in plain derogation
of the core public values associated with our water resources? If we accept a sharedvalues conception of the public interest, then how is it that states can defend
decisions to grant water rights that allow the dewatering of streams or the destruction
of ecological or recreational values for the narrow benefit of private parties?286 Such
claims are simply indefensible under any fair understanding of what it means that
the state owns the water and manages it for the benefit of the people that it serves.287
But I would go further. To my mind, the destruction of public values associated with
our water resources for the benefit of private parties is immoral because it turns the
very notion of protecting the public interest—a defining principle for any civil
society—on its head.
I am not suggesting that private parties are incapable of acquiring vested,
private water rights. They surely are. But I am suggesting, as Justice Rose so
eloquently stated in the Mineral County case, that states have an affirmative duty “to
protect the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and
tidelands . . . .”288 I applaud those states, such as Washington, California, and
perhaps Oregon, that seem to have largely embedded a public interest review into
every important decision over whether to authorize private use of water resources.289
285
See Bryant Walker Smith, Water as a Public Good: The Status of Water Under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 291, 301 (2009)
(“Today, water is unambiguously a public good. A survey of current domestic water laws
identified forty-four countries in which significant water resources belong to the state, the
nation, or the people; it identified no countries that disavowed such public ownership.”). See
generally DANTE A. CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION
(Marcella Nanni, ed., 3d ed. rev. 2019). Caponera details water law around the globe, noting
that even where private ownership of water has existed, “there is an increasing tendency to
consider water as community, public, crown, or state property.” Id. at 200. He concludes that
“[p]ublic ownership of water resources or state control over water is inevitable and
beneficial.” Id.
286
I include within the scope of the phrase “private parties” those special purpose
districts that claim the benefit of a quasi-public status that operate largely for the benefit of
their private party clients.
287
As Justice Holmes so eloquently noted, “[F]ew public interests are more obvious,
indisputable and independent of particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to
maintain the rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished . . . .” Hudson County
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908); see also supra note 84 and accompanying
text.
288
Mineral County v. State, 20 P.3d 800, 809 (Nev. 2001).
289
I say “largely” because every state can surely do better. Even Washington, for
example, seems unwilling to acknowledge that the public interest might limit water transfer
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And while I respect that many other states have occasionally seen fit to impose
public interest limits on private water rights, that is not nearly enough to protect the
public interest in the public’s water resources. This Part proposes a catalog of
policies that, if thoughtfully employed, could restore the public interest to its rightful
place as a limitation of private water rights—without upending traditional schemes
for water resource allocation in any significant way.
A. Define the Public Interest
At the beginning of this Article, I laid out my case for defining the public
interest in terms of those public, communal values that are typically associated with
our water resources. I believe that those values must be protected first—before
private parties are permitted to profit off of the public’s property. Nonetheless, I
recognize that other considerations that arguably reflect good government policy—
and thus a different type of public value—might come into play.290 Moreover, at
least some uses of water resources may simultaneously protect both public and
private interests.291
The bottom line, however, is that states must develop a concrete definition of
the public interest such that its application in individual cases will lead to an obvious
result. So, for example, when a private party applies for a water right that might
damage ecological resources, the public interest restriction should routinely lead the
water resources agency to impose conditions on the withdrawal and use of water that
will adequately protect the stream’s ecology. Parties might argue about whether
particular restrictions are necessary to protect the stream ecology, but not whether
the public interest requires its protection. In this way, a concrete definition should
apprise the relevant agencies, applicants, and members of the public of how the
public interest will likely constrain present and future water rights.
States will likely be tempted to follow the definitional approach taken by
Alaska’s water permit criteria law,292 which identifies eight factors to be considered
in reviewing water resource applications. But where these factors take account of
private economic benefits alongside public values, as the Alaska statute does, they
risk undermining those values, especially in light of probable rent-seeking behavior
on the part of private applicants.293 Under the Alaska approach, for example, the
or change applications.
290
See Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957, 962 (Utah 1943); Young & Norton v.
Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045, 1050 (N.M. 1910). In both of these cases, State Engineers favored
later applicants who were deemed to have stronger plans for making use of a limited water
supply.
291
For example, water resources to meet basic human needs for water, sanitation, and
food production might be in the public interest even if made possible by private parties.
292
See ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (2019); see also supra Section VII.B, notes 166–
169 and accompanying text.
293
To be fair to Alaska, in the only reported case where the issue arose, the court was
careful to require that public values be protected before private interests were considered,
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ecological health of a stream might be lawfully traded for an economic benefit to an
individual applicant or a segment of the community. Moreover, where the agency
decision-maker must choose from a range of unweighted but competing (and
perhaps conflicting) factors, the final decision seems likely to reflect political
pressure, and this could easily come at the cost of protecting actual public values.
Notwithstanding its limitations, Alaska is well-ahead of most other states in adopting
a reasonably clear and objective definition for the public interest that can help to
ensure a systematic administrative decision-making process, and that will provide
an administrative record upon which interested parties can obtain meaningful
judicial review.
A robust public rulemaking-style process, modeled on the civic republican
ideal,294 with the stated goal of protecting shared public values in water resources,
and with a nod to Rawls’ “veil of ignorance,”295 remains a better mechanism for
realizing a concrete, meaningful, and objective definition of the public interest that
is capable of protecting our shared values in water resources. While some degree of
rent-seeking may be inevitable, even with a civic republican approach, strong
ground rules and good leadership should go a long way to minimizing this
problem.296
B. Incorporate Public Interest Review and Adaptive Management into Every
Significant Decision Involving a State’s Water Resources
Despite the fact that the public interest is imposed as a statutory or even
constitutional limit on the authority of most states to grant water rights, many states
routinely ignore their obligation to at least consider—let alone protect—the public
interest.297 The most generous explanation for this failure may be that our notions
about the shared public values associated with water resources, such as ecological
and recreational values, have evolved considerably since water rights administration
regimes were first put in place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
In those early years, the focus was on “reclaiming” the land, which was understood
to mean bringing the land into agricultural production through irrigation. Water was
reasonably plentiful in those early years, and we had a far more limited appreciation
for ecological health and the recreational opportunities associated with water
notwithstanding the balancing test. See Tulkisarmute Native Cmty. Council v. Heinze, 898
P.2d 935 (Alaska 1995); see also supra Section VII.B, notes 166–169 and accompanying
text.
294
See DEWEY, supra note 72, at 207.
295
See RAWLS, supra note 66, at 163.
296
Because of the enormous pressure that will likely be brought to bear on agency
officials by private interests, applying the civic republican approach to this process will be
challenging. A successful process will require clear ground rules that articulate the agency’s
overarching goal of protecting the public interest and strong leadership from the ultimate
decision-maker.
297
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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resources. Consequently, as water allocation procedures were established,
consideration of the public interest fell into the background, to the point that granting
water rights for private use was itself deemed to be in the public interest.298 The lack
of a concrete definition for the public interest also made it easier to effectively ignore
the requirement in the course of approving water rights applications.
This, of course, is the reason that a definition is so important. Once the state
develops a clear and meaningful definition of the public interest, it becomes much
harder to avoid applying it to every request involving the use of the state’s water
resources. This includes the initial permit application, the water right adjudication
decision, the transfer or modification of a water right, and even more general
decisions such as the adjudication of water rights for an entire surface or
groundwater basin. Moreover, this “public interest review” need not be terribly
burdensome, because state fish and game agencies can usually provide the water
resources agency with detailed information about stream flows needed to protect
fish and other ecological values in a given waterbody.299 And state environmental
agencies can deliver comparable information regarding water quality. Thus, minor
applications can be processed rather quickly. And while large diversions or changes
in use will require more complex assessments, these can often be streamlined if the
approval provides for an adaptive management300 program for the affected water
resource based upon actual data that is gathered once the use commences. For
example, a party might be granted a permit for their water right that is subject to a
minimum stream flow to protect a fishery, with different flow regimes for different
times of the year. But as a condition for granting the right, the appropriator might
agree to work with the state to monitor the fishery to determine whether adjustments
298

When I first asked the former State Engineer of Wyoming, George Christopulos,
how he took into account the state’s public interest requirement he responded essentially
with this argument that private development of water resources was itself in the public
interest. Interview with George Christopulos, Former State Engineer, State of Wyo., at the
University of Wyoming College of Law, Laramie, Wyo. (c. 1987). This seems to be the
essential point behind the Nevada State Engineer’s public interest argument to the Nevada
Supreme Court in the Pyramid Lake case. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v.
Washoe Cty., 918 P.2d 697, 698–99 (Nev. 1996); see also supra note 177 and accompanying
text.
299
For states like Washington, Montana, and California that have statutes requiring
some form of environmental impact assessment, it should be relatively easy to incorporate a
public interest review into those analyses. See States with NEPA-like Environmental
Planning Requirements, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/nepa/downloads/
states-nepa-environmental-planning-requirements [https://perma.cc/S2XV-YY5H] (last
visited Aug. 16, 2018).
300
Adaptive management is a robust, iterative process of decision-making whereby
practitioners test hypotheses and adjust behavior, decisions, and actions based on experience
and changed conditions. See GEORGE H. STANKEY ET AL., U.S. FOREST SERV., ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES: THEORY, CONCEPTS, AND MANAGEMENT
INSTITUTIONS 8–9 (2005), https://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_gtr654.pdf [https://perma.
cc/P2KB-FVH8].
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are needed to either increase or decrease minimum flows, or to change the timing of
those flows to better protect the public resources. These obligations could ultimately
help or hurt the holder of the water right, but it has the advantage of allowing
adjustments to be made on the basis of actual data rather than speculation. Moreover,
this arrangement ensures protection of the public interest at the level that maximizes
opportunities for private use.
C. Announce that a Public Interest “Servitude” Limits Every Vested Water Right
Much water has been allocated throughout the Western United States—and
indeed throughout the world—often without a clear statement of any ongoing
restrictions on the right to use the respective water resources. It does not follow that
such restrictions are therefore unavailable. Rather, states ought to make clear to the
public, through their rules, statutes, or judicial decisions, that they retain the
authority to regulate water rights in the public interest.
Some in the water rights community seem to think that the state’s failure to
include restrictions in the water right itself makes their rights inviolate, at least
insofar as their historic use of the resource.301 They claim support for this position
under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (or
counterpart provisions of state constitutions),302 which prohibits the taking of private
property for a public use without just compensation.303 But a state’s imposition of
reasonable restrictions on pre-existing water rights is unlikely to support an
unconstitutional takings claim, for the reasons described below.
The basic framework for analyzing a regulatory takings claim under the U.S.
Constitution involves two parts. First is the question of whether the regulation

301

See, e.g., James L. Huffman et al., Constitutional Protections of Property Interests
in Western Water, 41 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 27, 47 (2019) (“[A]ny government
action that precludes use of the water right deprives the owner of some—or arguably all . . .
––of the economic value of the water right, meaning just compensation must be paid to the
owner.”); David R. E. Aladjem, There Is No Free Lunch: The Endangered Species Act, The
Public-Trust Doctrine and the Takings Clause, Presentation at 36th Annual Am. Bar Ass’n
Water Conference 2 (April 16–18, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
events/environment_energy_resources/2018/water/conference_materials/4_aladjem_david.
authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/25QR-GJFV] (“Th[e expropriation] doctrine allows for
the government to reallocate water when it deems such a reallocation to serve the public
interest but requires the government to compensate the owners of the rights in question. In
that way, the expropriation doctrine provides an intrinsic limit on such takings and so
implements one of the chief functions of the Takings Clause: preventing the government
from forcing a few people from bearing the burdens that should properly be borne by the
public at large.”).
302
See, e.g., Huffman et al., supra note 301, at 39–63; Aladjem, supra note 301, at 2
(citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).
303
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”).

680

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

amounts to a “total taking” of the property right.304 If so, then the U.S. Supreme
Court has suggested that compensation is owed unless the regulation was necessary
to prevent something akin to a common law nuisance.305 While questions about the
so-called “denominator” in a takings case remain somewhat unresolved,306 it seems
unlikely that seasonal restrictions on water withdrawals needed to protect ecological
flows, and that are likely to vary from year to year, could be characterized as a “total
taking.”
If a “total taking” is not shown, then the complaining party must look at the
character of the government regulation and its economic impact, particularly in
terms of how it might interfere with “distinct, investment-backed expectations” of
the owner.307 In the case of regulating water rights to protect the public interest, the
government is seeking to regulate property that it owns under a positive requirement
of law as against a private right to use that public property. Determining economic
impacts will depend on an “ad hoc factual inquiry,”308 but it seems unlikely that
regulators will impose public interest restrictions on existing water rights holders
that would completely deprive them of the ability to use their water right for the
purposes for which it was intended.309
Beyond the technical legal argument, Professor Joseph Sax has explained with
typical clarity why takings claims brought by holders of water rights will have
difficulty making their case:
Because rights granted in water have always been subject to what
Justice Holmes called an initial limitation of private rights, the subsequent
exercise of public authority [to limit] such rights, as in requiring releases
for in-stream flow maintenance, is neither a redefinition nor a repudiation
of property rights. Instead, it is a realization of a limit that was always
there . . . .
304

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (A “total taking” is one
where the government regulation deprives the owner of “all economically beneficial or
productive use of land.”).
305
Id. at 1022–23.
306
Compare Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016–17 n.7. (“The answer to this difficult question
may lay in how the owner’s reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State’s law of
property – i.e., whether and to what degree the State’s law has accorded legal recognition
and protection to the particular interest in land with respect to which the takings claimant
alleges a diminution in (or elimination of) value.”), with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n.
v. DeBendictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497–501 (1987) (stating that the answer may be “where an
owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the
bundle is not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.”).
307
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
308
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981).
309
See generally Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983),
(seeking an accommodation between private water rights and public rights was the primary
focus of the court). Similar efforts at accommodation seem likely where states impose pubic
interest restrictions on existing water rights.
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The roots of private property in water have simply never been deep
enough to vest in water users a compensable right to diminish lakes and
rivers or to destroy the marine life within them. Water is not like a pocket
watch or a piece of furniture, which an owner may destroy with impunity.
The rights of use in water, however long standing, should never be
confused with more personal, more fully owned, property. . . .
[R]ecognition of the right of the state to protect its water resources is only
a restatement of a familiar and oft-stated public prerogative.310
In other words, the public interest acts as an inherent limitation on the scope of
private property rights in water, which in turn limits the scope of potential takings
claims.
D. Engage the Public in the Enterprise of Managing Their Water
No public resource affords as much public value as water. We use it, of course,
to meet basic human needs, but we value water for so many other reasons—for
swimming, boating, fishing, and for pure aesthetic enjoyment. And we lament it
when water is polluted or depleted in ways that undermine these public uses. This is
not to deny the value of water for private purposes, but it does mean that the public
deserves to be engaged on all matters that may impact their shared use of a state’s
water resources. Many communities have formed “waterkeeper” or watershed
management organizations that are designed to stimulate and ensure public
involvement in the management of particular public waterways.311 States could do
much more to promote and support these types of organizations as a way to ensure
that public values are always part of any discussion about the use of public water
resources. Short of this, states could try to identify and engage individual fishermen,
boaters, and others who care about protecting communal rights in water.
State water resource agencies might also appoint a public ombudsman whose
mission would be to represent the shared public values associated with water
resources in every significant proceeding before the state agency. While not a perfect
substitute for actual community engagement, an ombudsman might at least help
ensure that someone representing communal values in water has a seat at the table.

310

See Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473,
481–482 (1989).
311
The Waterkeeper Alliance claims “more than 300 Waterkeeper Organizations and
Affiliates that are on the frontlines of the global water crisis, patrolling and protecting more
than 2.5 million square miles of rivers, lakes and coastal waterways on six continents.” See
About Us, WATERKEEPER ALLIANCE, https://waterkeeper.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/UNF3
-VTGK] (last visited Aug. 15, 2018); see also Search Results for Watershed Management,
RED LODGE CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.rlch.org/search/node/watershed%20management
[https://perma.cc/HB6S-D5WS] (last visited Aug. 15, 2018).
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The four policies proposed above, if fully and fairly implemented, could go a
long way toward restoring the public interest to its rightful place as a reasonable and
necessary limit on private water rights. But no one should expect that policies like
these will be adopted without significant public pressure. Fortunately, publicminded citizens interested in protecting our shared public values in water are not
without options for applying that pressure. Citizens and interest groups might, for
example, petition state water agencies to commence a rulemaking to define the
public interest and to establish a process for carrying out a public interest review for
decisions impacting water resources.312 While these agencies will likely be reluctant
to grant such petitions, the utter failure of many states to routinely consider public
values when they approve water rights, even in the face of statutory and
constitutional commands that they do so, could provide a compelling basis for a
court to force a state to take some action.313
Of course, even if a legislature or water agency agrees to take the first step by
defining the public interest, they will likely try their best to retain maximum
administrative discretion by adopting something along the lines of the Alaska
balancing test.314 But shared public values will necessarily have to be a part of the
equation,315 and interested parties can work to move public officials to give
preference to shared public values over private interests, as in fact happened in
Alaska’s Tulkisarmute Native Community case.316
Interested citizens might also challenge individual water resource decisions that
award private water rights at the expense of public rights—or decisions that fail to
even take account of their impact on public rights. In Wyoming, an effort to
adjudicate just such a claim was thrown out on justiciability grounds.317 But even in
Wyoming, a plaintiff might find success if they can demonstrate a clear connection
between a concrete injury that they suffered and the State’s failure to address public
interests. For example, if the state were to grant a water right that allowed the
dewatering of a stream, a party using the stream for fishing or recreational purposes
might have a legitimate claim that their injury resulted from the State’s failure to
protect the public interest, and would be redressable by a judicial order commanding
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See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-8-7 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.330 (2009);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-106 (1982).
313
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-8-16 (West 2019) (showing how state
administrative procedure laws often stipulate that parties “exhaust all administrative
remedies” before becoming able to petition for judicial review of the agency).
314
See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
315
The Alaska Water Use Act, for example, requires consideration of the effects of an
appropriation on fish and game, public recreation opportunities, public health, and access to
public waters. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (2018).
316
See Tulkisarmute Native Cmty. Council v. Heinze, 898 P.2d 935 (Alaska 1995).
317
William F. West Ranch v. Tyrell, 206 P.3d 722, 736 (Wyo. 2009). Interestingly, the
Wyoming Supreme Court intimated that the plaintiffs should have filed a petition for
rulemaking rather than seeking a declaratory judgment in court.
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the state to recognize the public interest.318 Further, if the state failed to even
consider the public interest on the record of its decision in approving a water right,
a plaintiff can argue that such failure renders the decision arbitrary and capricious.319
Interested citizens might also work with states to amend their water rights forms
to include questions and review criteria that can help ensure that both the applicant
and the water resources agency to consider public values before they reach a decision
on the application. Agencies should welcome such a change since it will provide
them with some evidence in the decision record that these values were taken into
account.
X. CONCLUSION AND THE PATH FORWARD
My quest to understand the public interest in water resources law led me to
consider the broader implications of a public interest standard in public policy more
generally. Here, I had to confront the inherent ambiguity of a term that demands
clarity because of its importance to public policy. With the help of other scholars,320
I was persuaded that public interests are those that reflect communal values, and
these must be distinguished from private interests. This was the frame that I used to
assess how well Western states—and by extension, most any jurisdiction with
positive water law—protects the important public interests in our water resources.
Following a survey of “the public interest” in Western water law, I concluded that
Western states—with a few notable exceptions—have largely abdicated their
responsibility to protect these public values. In trying to understand the reasons for
this failure, I came to realize that the term’s ambiguity provides political and legal
cover to water resource agencies that might prefer to avoid the politically difficult
choice that arises when proposals to grant private water rights adversely impact
communal values.
The most significant obstacle to solving this problem is therefore political, but
the problem can be solved, and the solution is relatively straightforward. A state
must begin by defining the public interest in objective, normative terms. I have
318

As previously noted, a Wyoming statute essentially invites agricultural appropriators
to dewater public streams. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-317 (1957); see also DuMars, supra
note 127.
319
In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983), where the U.S. Supreme Court famously described agency action as arbitrary and
capricious “if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Id. 43–44. The
failure to consider a clear requirement from a statute or the constitution would appear to
satisfy the second of the State Farm tests. State courts often look to the federal APA arbitrary
and capricious standard under State Farm and its progeny when assessing whether a state
agency action was arbitrary or capricious. See, e.g., Neah Bay Chamber of Commerce v.
Dep’t of Fisheries, 832 P.2d 1310, 1313–14 (Wash. 1992).
320
See FLATHMAN, supra note 24; ALEXANDER, supra note 52; Arendt, supra note 57.
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offered my own analysis of why the definition should reflect communal values and
not private interests, although I recognize that states may find other legitimate ways
to define the term. But however a state chooses to define the public interest, the
definition must be concrete enough to establish a clear standard for administrators
to apply in particular cases involving the allocation, use, and management of water
resources.
Further, public interest review of water resource decisions must become
routine. Employing the definition, state agencies must ensure that every decision
meets a public interest threshold. An adequate public interest review process must
also allow those who might disagree with the decision an opportunity to challenge
that decision in court on the basis of a thorough record that explains how the agency
addressed public interest concerns.
Finally, the longstanding failure of many state agencies to consider the public
interest in approving water resource uses cannot excuse significant conflicts with
public values. While it may be impractical and even impossible to fully restore
public values in our shared water resources, we can and should restore some balance
to the system without unduly impacting the settled expectations of existing water
users.
Our public waterways are the quintessential example of community property,
and billions of people around the globe rely on public water resources both for their
essential needs as well as their incalculable recreational, ecological, and aesthetic
values. Once lost, these resources may prove difficult or impossible to recover. With
heightened awareness and some political pressure, the public interest may yet prove
to be the bulwark that protects our public waters for present and future generations.

